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HOW SUBTERRANEAN REGULATION HINDERS 
INNOVATION IN ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY 
Myrisha S. Lewis† 
Most scholars believe assisted reproductive technology is subject only to 
minimal regulation, especially by the federal government. This belief, I contend, is 
wrong. In this Article, I examine agency documents, statements by officials, and 
letters that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has sent to physicians and 
researchers over the past fifteen years to reveal an overlooked regulatory program. 
The FDA has been targeting new forms of assisted reproductive technology that 
involve small genetic modifications (advanced assisted reproductive technologies or 
AARTs) through regulatory actions that receive little public, media, or scholarly 
attention. I term this method of regulation “subterranean regulation.” Subterranean 
regulatory actions chill research as many physicians and researchers halt their 
research after receiving these letters or stop providing access to AARTs in the United 
States. 
The existence of this unconventional and largely unnoticed regulatory practice 
raises a series of issues including whether the FDA should be regulating advanced 
assisted reproductive technologies at all. Moreover, a hidden, ad hoc regulatory 
practice is exactly the wrong kind of process to use when it comes to scientific 
innovations in fraught ethical areas, which includes not only assisted reproductive 
technology but also other DNA-modifying technologies such as gene editing 
(including CRISPR-Cas9). Ultimately, I recommend a regulatory approach that is as 
close to “minimal regulation” as possible. 
 
 †  Assistant Professor, Howard University School of Law; J.D., Columbia Law School; A.B., 
Harvard College. For helpful suggestions and comments, I would like to thank Lori Andrews, 
Bernadette Atauhene, Katharine Baker, Felice Batlan, Rabia Belt, Robert Bohrer, Alexander 
Boni-Saenz, Marie Boyd, Elizabeth Emens, Philip Genty, Patrick Goold, Sarah Harding, Jenny 
Ma, Nancy Marder, Kent McKeever, Jennifer Nou, Elizabeth Pendo, Maya Sabatello, 
Christopher Schmidt, Carolyn Shapiro, Stephanie Stern, and workshop participants at Howard 
University, Florida State University, St. Thomas University, the Chicago-Kent College of Law, 
the California Western School of Law, the Chicago Junior Faculty Workshop, the Tenth Annual 
Lutie A. Lytle Black Women Law Faculty Writing Workshop, and the American Society of 
Comparative Law’s Younger Comparativists Global Conference, where I presented earlier 
versions of this Article. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Commentators have described the regulatory environment 
surrounding assisted reproductive technology as “limited,” “minimally 
regulated,” and even “the Wild Wild West.”1 This Article reveals, 
however, that one important subset of assisted reproductive technology, 
the subset that contains forms of assisted reproductive technology that 
combine in vitro fertilization with the modification of small amounts of 
DNA (referred to herein as advanced assisted reproductive technologies 
or AARTs), is an exception to this general rule.2 Instead, the FDA highly 
regulates AARTs through an overlooked regulatory program that is 
mostly administered through letters as opposed to clearly applicable 
regulations. I term this method of regulation “subterranean regulation.” 
The FDA uses subterranean regulation to regulate medical 
techniques that are accompanied by ethical controversy including 
cloning, advanced assisted reproductive technologies, and 
unconventional methods of enhancing fertility.3 Over the past fifteen 
years, the FDA has sent “Untitled Letters” to practitioners who work on 
advanced assisted reproductive technologies.4 Untitled Letters are one 
 
 1 Michele Goodwin, Prosecuting the Womb, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1657, 1693 (2008) 
(“Here, the minimally regulated [assisted reproductive technology] industry thrives with 
minimal state interference or attention to fetal health outcomes or risks to mothers or 
fetuses.”); Alexander N. Hecht, The Wild Wild West: Inadequate Regulation of Assisted 
Reproductive Technology, 1 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 227, 228 (2001); see, e.g., NAOMI R. 
CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES: WHY THE FERTILITY MARKET NEEDS LEGAL REGULATION (2009); 
Naomi R. Chan & Jennifer M. Collins, Eight Is Enough, 103 NW. U. L. COLLOQUY 501, 507 
(2009) (“Currently, regulation over reproductive technology by the state and federal 
government is limited. The fertility industry mostly self regulates through nonbinding 
guidelines and suggested ethical practices, though there are various physician licensing 
requirements.”); Judith F. Daar, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Panacea or Paper Tiger?, 
34 HOUS. L. REV. 609, 615 (1997) (“[Assisted reproductive technology] is subject to little formal 
regulation . . . .”); see also DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND 
POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 5 (2006) (“In the United States, however, 
regulatory and legislative authorities have largely ignored the market for reproductive services. 
There are very few restrictions on fertility treatments and little regulation of providers.”); 
Marsha Garrison, Regulating Reproduction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1623 (2008); Hank Greely, 
Cloning and Government Regulation, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1085, 1089–90 (2002); Lars Noah, 
Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated Biomedical Innovation, 55 
FLA. L. REV. 603, 614–15 (2003). 
 2 This Article will refer to these types of assisted reproductive technologies which result in 
small modifications of DNA which will be inherited by future generations as “advanced assisted 
reproductive technologies.” Examples of these advanced assisted reproductive technologies 
include cytoplasmic transfer and mitochondrial transfer, a technique which was recently 
approved in the United Kingdom. 
 3 See infra note 132 (discussing Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request 2016-4882 
which provides information on the FDA’s regulation by letter of AUGMENT, a fertility 
treatment created by an American company that revitalizes a woman’s eggs; the technique is 
currently unavailable in the United States). 
 4 See infra note 132; see also Warning and Untitled Letters: FDA Transparency Initiative, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 20, 2011) [hereinafter Warning and Untitled Letters], https://
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type of communication that the FDA uses to inform companies and 
individuals that they are violating federal law.5 
However, the FDA’s process of issuing these letters to AART-
providers differs from the usual methods that the FDA uses to inform 
regulated entities of statutory violations, not only in the 
comprehensiveness of the letters but also in the recordkeeping related to 
these letters. For example, the FDA’s response to a Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) request that I submitted related to the first 
example of the FDA’s subterranean regulation of AARTs revealed that 
the FDA is “unable” to locate the addressees of these letters to AART-
providers and that it does not maintain such letters in a centralized 
document management system.6 Thus, while the content of those letters 
is available online, it is impossible to ascertain the scope of this type of 
regulation without a list of addressees. In some instances of 
subterranean regulation, the content of the letters is not even publicly 
available on the FDA’s website, such as in the 2013 case of a letter and 
subsequent communications between the FDA and a Massachusetts-
based provider of innovative assisted reproductive technology services.7 
 
www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/TransparencyInitiative/ucm284105.htm (“If a person 
or firm violates the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act), FDA may give them an 
opportunity to take voluntary and prompt action to correct the violation before FDA initiates 
an enforcement action. FDA will issue either a Warning Letter or an Untitled Letter, depending 
upon the nature of the violation. . . . FDA uses Untitled Letters for violations that are not as 
significant as those that trigger warning letters. Unlike a Warning Letter, an Untitled Letter 
does not include a statement warning that failure to promptly correct a violation may result in 
an enforcement action.”). 
 5 See Warning and Untitled Letters, supra note 4. Compare infra Appendix A, with 
Appendices B–D (The letter in Appendix A does not contain any statutory citation, nor does it 
explain how the Addressee’s actions allegedly violate the statutes that the FDA has 
responsibility for enforcing. By comparison, Appendix B mentions at least two specific 
statutes). Appendix C infra includes citations to specific statutory violations (e.g., 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 321(n), 352(a) (2012)), as does Appendix D (e.g., “This product is a device within the 
meaning of section 201(h) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(h), because it is . . . .”). 
 6 FOIA Request 2016-4883 revealed that the FDA was unable to “locate an admin file for 
the subject . . . letter.” E-mail from Ashlee Eswara, Microbiologist, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 
to author (Aug. 25, 2016, 8:27 AM) (on file with author). Similarly, before the request was 
officially closed, a conversation with an FDA employee in the FOIA division indicated that it 
was unlikely that the Agency would be able to find the file related to the letter because the 
Agency does not have a system for recordkeeping when an application is not active. Id. 
 7 See Letter from Ellen Lazarus, Dir., Div. of Human Tissues, Office of Cellular, Tissue & 
Gene Therapies, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Alison Lawton, Chief Operating Officer, 
OvaScience, Inc. (Apr. 9, 2013) (on file with author); Letter from Celia M. Witten, Dir., Office 
of Cellular, Tissue and Gene Therapies, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Alison Lawton, Chief 
Operating Officer, OvaScience, Inc. (Sept. 6, 2013) (on file with author); infra text 
accompanying notes 179–83 (regarding FOIA Request 2016-4882 and Massachusetts-based 
OvaScience’s AUGMENT technology which is now available in other countries but not the 
United States, and the FDA’s most recent 2017 letter to Dr. John Zhang); see also Ariana 
Eunjung Cha, FDA Cracks Down on Company Marketing “Three-Parent” Babies, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2017/08/07/fda-
cracks-down-on-company-marketing-three-parent-babies/?utm_term=.0562ad833f54. 
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Nevertheless, my review of Agency FOIA responses, media coverage, 
and, in the case of the aforementioned Massachusetts-based company, a 
shareholder suit, have enabled me to identify some of the recipients of 
the FDA’s subterranean letters, even in the absence of the Agency’s 
“admin file.” 
The first of the FDA’s subterranean letters to AART-providers was 
sent on July 6, 2001 to physicians who were providing an advanced 
assisted reproductive technology called “cytoplasmic transfer” to 
patients.8 The letter began by stating “[w]e want to advise you that the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has jurisdiction over human cells 
used in therapy involving the transfer of genetic material by means 
other than the union of gamete nuclei.”9 While two federal statutes were 
mentioned in the letter, there was no citation to any statutory provision 
that would provide the FDA’s “jurisdiction.”10 Even though the Agency 
provided no legal citation, the FDA still stated that physicians working 
on advanced assisted reproductive technologies would have to submit to 
the extensive drug approval process that applies to pharmaceutical 
companies seeking to market new drugs in the United States.11 
In subsequent communications, including guidance documents 
and other documents posted on the Agency’s website, the FDA has 
ordered that all advanced assisted reproductive technologies, including 
mitochondrial transfer, a potentially life-saving technique that has been 
the subject of recent media coverage, obtain premarket approval prior to 
clinical use.12 However, just as with cytoplasmic transfer in 2001, the 
 
 8 See infra Appendix A; see also, e.g., Transcript of Center for Biologics Evaluation and 
Research, Food and Drug Administration, Biological Response Modifiers Advisory Committee 
Open Session Meeting #32, 47 (May 9, 2002, 8:00 AM) [hereinafter Meeting #32 Transcript], 
https://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/ac/02/transcripts/3855t1-01.pdf (“FDA had concerns 
about whether we understood all the ramifications of this procedure and whether we 
understood its safety in particular, and reacted by sending letters to practitioners who were 
identified by publications on ooplasm [cytoplasm] transfer or by advertisements offering the 
procedure. We advised practitioners that we would now require the submission of an 
investigational new drug application, or IND, to the agency and its subsequent review to 
continue to treat new patients.”). 
 9 See infra Appendix A. While the content of the letter is available on the FDA’s website, 
the list of recipients is not. See supra note 6. 
 10 See infra Appendix A; see also discussion infra Part II (discussing how, by not providing 
a specific statutory provision in its Untitled Letters, this action differs from the FDA’s usual 
practice of clearly identifying an addressee’s illegal actions and the exact statutory provision 
that those actions violate). 
 11 The letter stated that “[t]he use of such genetically manipulated cells (and/or their 
derivatives) in humans constitutes a clinical investigation and requires submission of an 
Investigational New Drug application (IND) to FDA,” which was followed by a confusing 
sentence later in the letter that stated “[w]e can advise you whether or not your activities 
require submission of an IND.” Infra Appendix A. 
 12 See, e.g., PARLIAMENTARY OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH., PREVENTING MITOCHONDRIAL 
DISEASE (Mar. 2013) [hereinafter PREVENTING MITOCHONDRIAL DISEASE], http://
researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/POST-PN-431/POST-PN-431.pdf (providing 
a brief, but detailed overview of mitochondrial disease and its advantages and disadvantages. 
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FDA has provided no clear explanation of the source of its jurisdiction 
over these techniques or why this divergence from the Agency’s “hands-
off” treatment of conventional assisted reproductive technology is 
justified.13 After receiving the FDA’s letters, physicians stopped 
providing access to advanced assisted reproductive technologies in the 
United States.14 Recent media coverage, for example, has focused on 
New York–based physicians who traveled to Mexico to provide 
mitochondrial transfer to a couple, explaining that “[t]o save lives is the 
ethical thing to do.”15 
This Article is the first article to combine the analysis of 
cytoplasmic transfer, mitochondrial transfer, and cloning to reveal that 
the FDA’s subterranean regulation of advanced assisted reproductive 
technologies is based on the FDA’s successful banning of human 
reproductive cloning in the United States through agency-issued letters 
in 1998. It is also the first article to review primary sources including 
FOIA requests (and responses) in order to posit that the FDA’s 
regulation of genetic modifications in reproduction is driven, at least 
partially, by ethical objections in addition to a lack of jurisdiction over 
 
This document was created before the United Kingdom (U.K.) Parliament approved 
regulations permitting mitochondrial transfer in the United Kingdom); Steve Connor, Three-
Parent Baby Pioneer: “The Brits Will Be Ahead of the World”; Despite the Death of Prematurely 
Born Twins, the Doctor Behind a Revolutionary Fertility Technique Tells Steve Connor It Is Safe, 
INDEPENDENT (Jan. 17, 2015), https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/a59bd3b8-c233-4526-
9937-48e9a66c1e07/?context=1000516; see also FDA Regulation of Human Cells, Tissues, and 
Cellular and Tissue-Based Products (HCT/P’s) Product List, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 
[hereinafter FDA Regulation of Human Cells], https://www.fda.gov/biologicsbloodvaccines/
tissuetissueproducts/regulationoftissues/ucm150485.htm (last updated Feb. 2, 2018). 
 13 See Sabrina Tavernise, His Fertility Advance Draws Ire: Shoukhrat Mitalipov’s 
Mitochondrial Manipulations, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/
18/science/shoukhrat-mitalipovs-mitochrondrial-manipulations.html (“Dr. Dorsa said the 
university still has not decided whether to formally ask the F.D.A. for permission to move 
forward with clinical trials.”). As of July 12, 2016, the university still had not submitted an 
investigational new drug application to the FDA. See FDA Regulation of Human Cells, supra 
note 12 (where the FDA lists “HUMAN CELLS USED IN THERAPY INVOLVING THE 
TRANSFER OF GENETIC MATERIAL” listing “cell nuclei, oocyte nuclei, mitochondrial 
genetic material in ooplasm, genetic material contained in a genetic vector” as products that are 
regulated under “Section 351 of the [Public Health Service] Act and/or the [Food, Drug & 
Cosmetic] Act” without explaining how the communicable disease provision of the Public 
Health Service Act “and/or” the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act applies to these products); see 
also discussion infra Part II (explaining that the application of the FDA’s Human Tissue 
Regulations to human reproductive tissue is counterintuitive and contradictory). 
 14 See Meeting #32 Transcript, supra note 8; infra text accompanying note 87. 
 15 Michelle Roberts, First “Three Person Baby” Born Using New Method, BBC NEWS (Sept. 
27, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/health-37485263; see also Denise Grady, Pregnancy 
Created Using Egg Nucleus of Infertile Woman, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2003), http://
www.nytimes.com/2003/10/14/us/pregnancy-created-using-egg-nucleus-of-infertile-
woman.html (citing Dr. James Grifo, one of the physicians targeted by FDA letters on 
cytoplasmic transfer: “Dr. Grifo said he and his colleagues gave their findings to doctors in 
China because regulations imposed by the United States Food and Drug Administration in 
2001 made it too difficult to continue the research in the United States.”). 
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these forms of technology that happen to inhabit areas fraught with 
ethical concerns and political opposition.16 In addition to submitting 
FOIA requests related to the content and scope of subterranean letters, I 
analyzed other primary sources, including Federal Register issuances, 
responses to FOIA requests, communications with researchers, 
congressional testimony, and FDA Advisory Committee meeting 
transcripts.17 A review of these primary sources indicates that 
sometimes FDA employees misunderstand the science underlying 
AARTs and at other times, these employees attempt to muddle ethical 
opposition with safety concerns in order to prevent the clinical use of 
technology that the FDA deems objectionable.18 
 
 16 See Susan L. Crockin & Gary A. Debele, Ethical Issues in Assisted Reproduction: A Primer 
for Family Law Attorneys, 27 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 289, 301 (2015); Judith Daar, Multi-
Party Parenting in Genetics and Law: A View from Succession, 49 FAM. L.Q. 71, 74 (2015); John 
A. Robertson, Oocyte Cytoplasmic Transfers and the Ethics of Germ-Line Intervention, 26 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 211 (1998). Some scholars have speculated on the possible reasons for the 
FDA’s decision to assert jurisdiction over specific technologies such as cloning or cytoplasmic 
transfer from a regulatory or statutory perspective. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, Is There a Right to 
Clone? Constitutional Challenges to Bans on Human Cloning, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 643, 669 
(1998); Valarie K. Blake, Ovaries, Testicles, and Uteruses, Oh My! Regulating Reproductive 
Tissue Transplants, 19 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 353 (2013); Clarke D. Forsythe, Human 
Cloning and the Constitution, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 469, 470 (1998); Kerry Lynn Macintosh, Brave 
New Eugenics: Regulating Assisted Reproductive Technologies in the Name of Better Babies, 2010 
U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 257, 271–74; Elizabeth C. Price, Does the FDA Have Authority to 
Regulate Human Cloning?, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 619, 628 (1998); see also Gregory J. Rokosz, 
Human Cloning: Is the Reach of FDA Authority Too Far a Stretch?, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 464, 
468 (2000). 
 17 See Telephone Conference with Rachael Anatol & Celia Witten, U.S. Food & Drug 
Admin., and Michelle Dipp & Allison Lawton, OvaScience, Inc. (Sept. 9, 2013) (summary of 
teleconference on file with author); E-mail from Michelle Dipp, CEO, OvaScience, Inc., to Celia 
M. Witten, Dir., Office of Cellular, Tissue & Gene Therapies, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Sept. 
10, 2013, 5:25 PM) (on file with author); Letter from Ellen Lazarus, Dir., Office of Cellular, 
Tissue & Gene Therapies, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Alison Lawton, Chief Operating 
Officer, OvaScience, Inc. (Apr. 9, 2013) (on file with author); E-mail from Alison Lawton, Chief 
Operating Officer, OvaScience, Inc., to Patrick Riggins, Branch Chief, U.S. Food and Drug 
Admin. (Jan. 28, 2013, 12:37 PM) (on file with author); Telephone Conference with Richard 
McFarland & Lori Tull, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., and Karen Nichols, OvaScience, Inc. (Dec. 
20, 2013) (record of telephone conversation on file with author); E-mail from Patrick Riggins, 
Branch Chief, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to unknown recipient (Aug. 22, 2013, 12:38 PM) (on 
file with author); E-mail from Celeste Smith, FOIA Officer, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to 
author (Sept. 9, 2016, 10:08 AM) (on file with author); Letter from Catherine Wilusz, 
Consumer Safety Officer, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to author (July 8, 2016) (on file with 
author); E-mail from John Wright, Admin. Proceedings Specialist, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 
on behalf of Dynna Bigby, Supervisory Admin. Proceedings Officer, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 
to author (Aug. 14, 2016, 11:23 AM) (on file with author); E-mail from Ashlee Eswara to 
author, supra note 6; Letter from Celia M. Witten to Alison Lawton, supra note 7; see also 
discussion infra Parts III–IV. 
 18 See Meeting #32 Transcript, supra note 8 (“FDA had concerns about whether we 
understood all the ramifications of this procedure and whether we understood its safety in 
particular, and reacted by sending letters to practitioners who were identified by publications 
on ooplasm [cytoplasm] transfer or by advertisements offering the procedure. We advised 
practitioners that we would now require the submission of an investigational new drug 
application, or IND, to the agency and its subsequent review to continue to treat new 
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This Article makes several contributions to the literature. My 
descriptive claim is that the FDA is regulating by letter in the area of 
advanced assisted reproductive technologies. This expands the 
administrative law literature by identifying and describing another 
“informal tool” that federal agencies may use to regulate industries.19 In 
this Article, I both identify the concept of subterranean regulation and 
offer an explanation as to why the FDA might be using it. After 
explaining how the FDA regulates AARTs in a subterranean fashion, I 
argue that the FDA should not be regulating advanced assisted 
reproductive technologies in a subterranean manner or in any other 
manner that subjects them to unique federal regulation. First, it is likely 
that the FDA lacks jurisdiction over AARTs under applicable statutes, 
namely the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and the Public Health Service 
Act.20 Second, AARTs do not fall within the categories of products that 
the FDA regulates, and the FDA’s regulatory scheme is not structured to 
objectively regulate them. Third, the result of the use of the FDA’s 
overlooked regulatory program has been to allow the FDA to insert 
ethical concerns into its regulation of assisted reproductive technology, 
which is an inappropriate action for an administrative agency that has 
been tasked with addressing the safety and effectiveness of regulated 
products such as drugs and medical devices.21 Ultimately, the Article is 
driven by an effort to render the regulation of AARTs as transparent as 
possible. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of 
advanced assisted reproductive technologies. Part II analyzes the 
jurisdictional issues related to mitochondrial transfer and other 
advanced assisted reproductive technologies including the confusion 
over whether the agency’s enabling statutes apply to these technologies. 
Part II also analyzes the differences between AARTs and the standard 
categories of products regulated by the FDA (i.e., food, drugs, medical 
devices, and biologics).22 I also explain the concept of “subterranean 
 
patients.”). For a general overview of the ethical issues that arise as a result of mitochondrial 
transfer, see César Palacios-González, Ethics of Mitochondrial Replacement Techniques: A 
Habermasian Perspective, 31 BIOETHICS 27 (2017). 
 19 Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L.J. 1841, 1841–42 (2011); see also Lars Noah, 
Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional Delegations of Authority, 1997 
WIS. L. REV. 873 (1997). 
 20 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–99h (2012); Public Health 
Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201–300mm-61 (2012). 
 21 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 129 (2000) (“Under 21 
U.S.C. § 360j(e), the agency may ‘require that a device be restricted to sale, distribution, or 
use . . . upon such other conditions as [the FDA] may prescribe in such regulation, if, because 
of its potentiality for harmful effect or the collateral measures necessary to its use, [the FDA] 
determines that there cannot otherwise be reasonable assurance of its safety and 
effectiveness.’”). 
 22 See What Does FDA Regulate?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm194879.htm (last updated Jan. 23, 2018). 
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regulation,” using the regulation of AARTs as a starting point. Part III 
explains how longstanding concerns about ethical issues, which are 
mentioned in FDA officials’ public statements but not included in their 
written communications with physicians and researchers, help explain 
why the FDA regulates advanced assisted reproductive technologies in a 
subterranean fashion. Part IV explains why the FDA should not be 
regulating AARTs at all. Part IV also observes that the same ethical 
issues that accompany advanced assisted reproductive technologies also 
accompany other developing technologies that may modify the human 
genetic code in order to treat disease, such as genome editing through 
CRISPR-Cas9, a technique that has received substantial media coverage 
not only due to its exciting treatment possibilities but also due to 
surrounding patent litigation, and other technologies that allow for the 
editing of genes.23 In other words, the conditions that allow for and 
motivate subterranean regulation in the field of assisted reproductive 
technology such as political pressure, ethical opposition, scientific 
misunderstanding, and lack of federal agency jurisdiction, will continue 
to arise in relation to other developing biotechnologies. Thus, 
transparent regulation and a clear regulatory path forward will become 
more pressing as the FDA’s current regulatory scheme will likely be an 
obstacle for other medical innovations as science moves towards 
targeting genes as a method of curing or preventing disease. 
I.     ADVANCED ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: 
COMBINING GENETIC MODIFICATIONS WITH IN VITRO FERTILIZATION 
Advanced assisted reproductive technologies, such as cytoplasmic 
transfer and mitochondrial transfer involve the use of in vitro 
fertilization and genetic material from a donor. 
In vitro fertilization (IVF) is a procedure by which a female egg is 
 
 23 See Ewen Callaway, UK Scientists Gain Licence to Edit Genes in Human Embryos, 
NATURE (Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.nature.com/news/uk-scientists-gain-licence-to-edit-genes-
in-human-embryos-1.19270; see also John Cohen, Round One of CRISPR Patent Legal Battle 
Goes to the Broad Institute, SCIENCE (Feb. 15, 2017, 2:30 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/
news/2017/02/round-one-crispr-patent-legal-battle-goes-broad-institute; Antonio Regalado, 
Engineering the Perfect Baby, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 5, 2015), https://
www.technologyreview.com/s/535661/engineering-the-perfect-baby; Questions and Answers 
About CRISPR, BROAD INST., https://www.broadinstitute.org/what-broad/areas-focus/project-
spotlight/questions-and-answers-about-crispr (last visited Feb. 27, 2018) (noting that “[i]n 
January 2013, the Zhang lab” at the Broad Institute and MIT “published the first method to 
engineer CRISPR to edit the genome in mouse and human cells”). The terms “gene editing” 
and “genome editing” are used interchangeably in the literature when describing CRISPR-Cas9. 
See What Are Genome Editing and CRISPR-Cas9?, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MED. (Feb. 20, 2018), 
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/genomicresearch/genomeediting (“Genome editing (also called 
gene editing) is a group of technologies that give scientists the ability to change an organism’s 
DNA.”). 
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fertilized outside the womb by male sperm, with the intent that the 
resulting zygote will later be transplanted into the female 
reproductive system of either the intended mother or another 
woman who is serving as a surrogate.24 
A cell essentially contains three parts: cytoplasm, nucleus, and 
mitochondria.25 The nucleus, which is the center of the cell, is 
surrounded by cytoplasm.26 Mitochondria are located in the cytoplasm 
of the cell.27 
With cytoplasmic transfer, donor genetic material (from the 
cytoplasm of an egg cell) is used to improve fertility outcomes.28 In 
contrast, with mitochondrial transfer, donor genetic material 
(specifically mitochondria) is used in order to prevent the maternal 
transmission of some genetic diseases caused by defective mitochondria 
such as muscular dystrophy and heart and liver conditions.29 Pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis is insufficient to prevent the maternal 
 
 24 CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE 91 (2d ed. 2012). 
 25 See Charlotte Pritchard, The Girl with Three Biological Parents, BBC NEWS (Sept. 1, 
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-28986843 (defining the components of a cell as: 
“Nucleus: Where the majority of our DNA is held - this determines how we look and our 
personality[;] Mitochondria: Often described as the cell’s factories, these create the energy to 
make the cell function[;] Cytoplasm: The jelly like substance that contains the nucleus and 
mitochondria[.]”). 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 See GEOFF WATTS ET AL., NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, NOVEL TECHNIQUES FOR 
THE PREVENTION OF MITOCHONDRIAL DNA DISORDERS: AN ETHICAL REVIEW 1, 36 (2012), 
http://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Novel_techniques_for_the_
prevention_of_mitochondrial_DNA_disorders_compressed.pdf. In cytoplasmic transfer, eggs 
are obtained from both the intended mother and an egg donor, and cytoplasm from a healthy 
egg is injected into the intended mother’s egg. Id. Children born as a result of cytoplasmic 
transfer are genetically related to their intended mother and intended father; these children also 
have “an additional mitochondrial genetic connection to a second woman provided by an 
injection of her cytoplasm.” Id. at 70. 
 29 See, e.g., NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., MITOCHONDRIAL REPLACEMENT 
TECHNIQUES: ETHICAL, SOCIAL, AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 1, 20–23 (2016) [hereinafter 
MITOCHONDRIAL REPLACEMENT TECHNIQUES]. Using mitochondrial transfer, scientists replace 
an intended mother’s defective mitochondria with mitochondria from a healthy female donor 
either in the intended mother’s egg before in vitro fertilization occurs or in a fertilized embryo 
after in vitro fertilization has occurred. The healthy embryo is then implanted into the intended 
mother. There are three ways of acquiring diseases that affect mitochondria, one of which is 
inheriting a harmful mitochondrial mutation from the mother. Id. at 4; see also Gráinne S. 
Gorman et al., Mitochondrial Donation—How Many Women Could Benefit?, 372 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 885 (2015); Ian Sample, Three-Person IVF: UK Government Backs Mitochondrial 
Transfer, GUARDIAN (June 28, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/science/2013/jun/28/uk-
government-ivf-dna-three-people; WATTS ET AL., supra note 28, at 21 (noting that 
mitochondria generate energy for the cell, and mitochondrial mutations tend to have “the most 
impact on organs of the body with a relatively high need for energy” such as the “brain, heart, 
kidneys and major muscle groups” and thus, defective mitochondria tend to affect major 
organs and a number of symptoms can result including blindness, deafness, and organ failure). 
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transmission of mitochondrial disease.30 While defective mitochondria 
are maternally transmitted, male and female children are at equal risk of 
developing mitochondrial disease, so selecting only male embryos 
would not prevent the development of mitochondrial disease.31 
Because both cytoplasmic transfer and mitochondrial transfer 
involve the transfer of a donor’s genetic material, both techniques would 
result in an inheritable genetic modification that would be passed on to 
future generations.32 Nuclear DNA contains approximately 20,000 to 
30,000 genes, accounting for approximately 99.9% of all of humans’ 
genes; the remaining percentage is made of the thirty-seven genes 
contained in mitochondrial DNA.33 As a result, with mitochondrial 
transfer, only 0.1% of the healthy child’s DNA is different from that of 
his or her parents.34 The value of 0.1%, which is often cited in press 
accounts, is actually rounded up: “mitochondrial DNA represents less 
than 0.054 per cent of the total DNA . . . .”35 This change in 
mitochondrial DNA, in the view of some commentators, constitutes a 
“modification of [the] human germline” which is a source of ethical 
 
 30 See WATTS ET AL., supra note 28, at 23 (“In reproduction, a small number of the woman’s 
mitochondria are selected to populate all the cells of the resulting child in much greater 
numbers, a phenomenon known as the ‘mitochondrial bottleneck.’” Thus, a woman with a 
small proportion of defective mitochondria can pass a larger proportion of those mutant 
mitochondria on to her children. “Patients with the symptoms of mitochondrial DNA disorders 
are therefore likely to have mutations either in a high proportion of their mitochondria 
(heteroplasmy) in the affected tissues or, when viable, in all of the mitochondria 
(homoplasmy). . . .Generally, as the proportion of mutated mitochondria becomes higher, 
progressively more severe symptoms will result.”); see also Daniel Paull et al., Nuclear Genome 
Transfer in Human Oocytes Eliminates Mitochondrial DNA Variants, 493 NATURE 632, 632 
(2013) (“[A]n unaffected carrier of a [mitochondrial DNA] mutation may have an affected 
child. Although prenatal genetic diagnosis can select embryos with a reduced mutation load, 
variation between blastomeres in single embryos limits the effectiveness of such screening, and 
considerable levels of mutant [mitochondrial DNA] can remain, resulting in a carrier.” (citing 
L.M. Cree et al., A Reduction of Mitochondrial DNA Molecules During Embryogenesis Explains 
the Rapid Segregation of Genotypes, 40 NATURE GENETICS 249 (2008))). 
 31 See MARK S. FRANKEL & BRENT T. HAGEN, NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, GERMLINE 
THERAPIES 11 (2011), http://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/Germline_therapies_
background_paper.pdf. 
 32 See Transcript of Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug 
Administration, Cellular, Tissue, and Gene Therapies Advisory Committee Meeting #59 (Feb. 
25, 2014) [hereinafter Meeting #59 Transcript], https://wayback.archive-it.org/7993/
20170113010701/http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeeting
Materials/BloodVaccinesandOtherBiologics/CellularTissueandGeneTherapiesAdvisory
Committee/UCM426293.pdf; Erik Parens & Eric Juengst, Inadvertently Crossing the Germ Line, 
292 SCIENCE 397 (Apr. 20, 2001) (characterizing the transfer of mitochondrial DNA as a “side 
effect” of cytoplasm transfer). 
 33 See WATTS ET AL., supra note 28, at 18–19. 
 34 See id. at 19. 
 35 Sally Davies, Sally Davies: Why I Back “Three-Parent Babies” Law, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 3, 
2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/science/science-news/11385721/Sally-
Davies-Why-I-back-three-parent-babies-law.html (Professor Dame Sally Davies is the U.K.’s 
Chief Medical Officer and Chief Scientific Adviser to the Telegraph.). 
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opposition to advanced assisted reproductive technologies.36 The 
debatable definition of a germline modification will be discussed in Part 
III. 
AARTs transfer mitochondrial DNA and not nuclear DNA.37 
Mitochondrial DNA “is not part of the nuclear DNA, which determines 
our personal characteristics and traits such as personality, hair[,] and 
eye colour.”38 Because nuclear DNA determines inherited appearance-
related traits such as eye color, hair color, and height, and AARTs only 
affect mitochondrial DNA, a child born as a result of the use of an 
advanced assisted reproductive technology would still look like his or 
her parents.39 
Cytoplasmic transfer, an advanced assisted reproductive 
technology, has been used in the United States, but is no longer available 
in the United States after researchers received “Untitled Letters” from 
the FDA on July 6, 2001.40 When researchers appeared at an FDA 
Advisory Committee meeting after receiving the letters, a total of “at 
least 23 children” had been born in the United States using cytoplasmic 
transfer.41 
Mitochondrial transfer has not been approved for clinical use in 
humans in the United States even though thousands of women (and 
their children) could benefit from this disease-preventing technology.42 
 
 36 See FRANKEL & HAGEN, supra note 31, at 1, 5–6 (citations omitted) (“Because [nuclear 
DNA and mitochondrial DNA are not the same], some researchers and clinicians restrict the 
definition of germline modification to modification of [nuclear DNA] alone. However, many 
argue that [mitochondrial DNA] modification does indeed amount to germline modification.” 
(citations omitted)); see also Meeting #59 Transcript, supra note 32, at 118 (A germline 
modification such as that which would occur as a result of mitochondrial transfer would not 
only result in a mother having a healthy child, but also that child having mutation-free eggs; 
thus, the transmission of defective mitochondria would end in that family.). 
 37 See Davies, supra note 35. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See Kenan Malik, Opinion, The Three-Parent Baby’s First Step, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/23/opinion/the-three-parent-babys-first-step.html?_
r=0; see also Andrew Sparrow, MPs Back Mitochondrial Donation Law By Majority of 254: 
Politics Live Blog, GUARDIAN: POLITICS (Feb. 3, 2015, 12:45 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/
politics/blog/live/2015/feb/03/william-hagues-speech-on-english-votes-for-english-laws-evel-
politics-live-blog (citing Labour Party politician Liz McInnes, a former biochemist with the 
National Health Service, who voted in favor of mitochondrial transfer). 
 40 See discussion infra Part II (discussing these Untitled Letters); see also Holly Firfer, How 
Far Will Couples Go to Conceive?, CNN (June 17, 2004, 6:44 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2004/
HEALTH/03/12/infertility.treatment/index.html; supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text 
(discussing the FDA’s use of Warning Letters and Untitled Letters). 
 41 Meeting #32 Transcript, supra note 8, at 46. 
 42 See Gorman et al., supra note 29, at 886 (noting that, as per 2012 data, 12,423 women of 
child-bearing age in the United States could possibly pass a mitochondrial disease on to their 
offspring); see also James Gallagher, UK Approves Three-Person Babies, BBC NEWS (Feb. 24, 
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/health-31594856; Tavernise, supra note 13 (“Dr. Dorsa said 
the university still has not decided whether to formally ask the F.D.A. for permission to move 
forward with clinical trials.”). As of July 12, 2016, the University still had not submitted an 
investigational new drug application to the FDA. 
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After an extensive public consultation, described in Part IV, and the 
approval of regulatory amendments by Parliament, human clinical trials 
involving mitochondrial transfer are ongoing in the United Kingdom 
(U.K.).43 The science underlying advanced assisted reproductive 
technologies has been explained in newspaper articles, parliamentary 
briefings, and public meetings; in other words, the science is not that 
difficult to understand, but as will be explained in Part III, the ethical 
opposition, especially in the United States, is inevitable.44 
II.     THE REGULATION OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
Although there are laws that apply to the use of assisted 
reproductive technology, the industry is often characterized as 
“unregulated,” “minimally regulated,”45 or “self-regulated” when 
compared to other industries.46 In the United States, assisted 
reproductive technology is generally governed by state law with the 
exception of one federal law, the Fertility Clinic Success Rate Act.47 
With only one federal law addressing the regulation of assisted 
reproductive technology, the federal government has been described as 
“essentially silent.”48 Under the 1992 Fertility Clinic Success Rate and 
Certification Act, all clinics using assisted reproductive technology 
techniques must report success rate data to the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention on an annual basis.49 During the congressional 
 
 43 See Gorman et al., supra note 29, at 886 (noting that, in 2015, 2,473 women of child-
bearing age in the United Kingdom could possibly pass a mitochondrial disease onto their 
offspring); see also Gallagher, supra note 42. 
 44 See Gallagher, supra note 42; see also Mitochondrial Replacement, HUMAN FERTILISATION 
& EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., http://web.archive.org/web/20150912083629/http://hfea.gov.uk/
6896.html (last updated July 9, 2015); PREVENTING MITOCHONDRIAL DISEASE, supra note 12. 
 45 Goodwin, supra note 1. 
 46 See Martha M. Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market?: A New and Improved 
Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (2003) (discussing the lack of regulation 
of the “parenthood market”); Jane Gitschier, The Ethics of Our Inquiry: An Interview with Hank 
Greely, 11 PLOS GENETICS (Nov. 6, 2014) (quoting an interview with Hank Greely, who 
characterized assisted reproductive technology as “[a]lmost entirely” unregulated in the United 
States); Debora Spar & Anna M. Harrington, Building a Better Baby Business, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. 
& TECH. 41 (2009) (discussing the lack of regulation of the “fertility market,” which is the 
market for the sale of gametes for use in assisted reproduction); Sonia M. Suter, Giving in to 
Baby Markets: Regulation Without Prohibition, 16 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 217, 231 (2009); Chan 
& Collins, supra note 1, at 507–08. 
 47 See Michele Goodwin, A View from the Cradle: Tort Law and the Private Regulation of 
Assisted Reproduction, 59 EMORY L.J. 1039, 1071–72, 1079 (2010). 
 48 SPAR, supra note 1, at 51. 
 49 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 263a-1–7 (2012) (codifying the Fertility Clinic Success Rate Act); see also 
The Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act, CENTERS DISEASE CONTROL, http://
www.cdc.gov/art/nass/policy.html (last updated Feb. 8, 2017) (citing to Pub. L. No. 102-493, 
106 Stat. 3146 (1992)). Also, while the National Institutes of Health (NIH) arise in discussions 
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debate preceding the enactment of the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and 
Certification Act, “the FDA was never mentioned . . . as having 
jurisdiction over fertility clinic procedures.”50 
State law generally does not restrict the mechanics of assisted 
reproductive technology, such as how many embryos can be implanted 
or how many times the reproductive tissue of one donor can be used.51 
States, and not the FDA, also regulate the practice of medicine through 
the licensing of the medical personnel who would perform procedures 
involving assisted reproductive technology.52 Other than these 
provisions, state regulation of assisted reproductive technology is 
“limited.”53 Moreover, professional organizations such as the American 
Society for Reproductive Medicine issue guidelines for providers of 
 
related to embryos and research funding, the NIH, while an operating division of the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, does not have a role in the regulation of assisted 
reproductive technology. Instead, the NIH’s role in the development of assisted reproductive 
technology is very limited as the agency specifically does not fund scientific research that 
modifies the human germline but does not regulate its legality. See NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, 
DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NIH GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING RECOMBINANT 
OR SYNTHETIC NUCLEIC ACID MOLECULES (NIH GUIDELINES) (Apr. 2016), https://
osp.od.nih.gov/wp-content/uploads/NIH_Guidelines.html#_Toc446948304; Francis S. Collins, 
Statement on NIH Funding of Research Using Gene-Editing Technologies in Human Embryos, 
NAT’L INSTITUTES HEALTH (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/who-we-are/nih-
director/statements/statement-nih-funding-research-using-gene-editing-technologies-human-
embryos. 
 50 See Gregory J. Rokosz, Human Cloning: Is the Reach of FDA Authority Too Far a Stretch?, 
30 SETON HALL L. REV. 464, 503 n.201 (2000) (citing Elizabeth C. Price, Does the FDA Have 
Authority to Regulate Human Cloning, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 619, 631 (1998)). 
 51 See Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated 
Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 615–16 (2003); Michael Ollove, States Aren’t Eager 
to Regulate Fertility Industry, USA TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/
03/18/pew-stateline-assisted-reproduction/24984249 (last updated Mar. 26, 2015, 3:22 PM). 
 52 See Marion Abecassis, Artificial Wombs: “The Third Era of Human Reproduction” and 
the Likely Impact on French and U.S. Law, 27 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 10 (2016) (explaining 
that states regulate the practice of medicine “through licensing of practitioners, including 
suspension and revocation of licenses in instances of malpractice”); see also LASIK: FDA’s Role, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedical
Procedures/SurgeryandLifeSupport/LASIK/ucm061319.htm (last updated Jan. 18, 2018); 
Rokosz, supra note 50, at 491 n.147 (quoting University of Virginia Law School professor 
Richard Merrill, who stated that “the FDA is not supposed to regulate the practice of 
medicine”). 
 53 See Hillary B. Alberta et al., Risk Disclosure and the Recruitment of Oocyte Donors: Are 
Advertisers Telling the Full Story?, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 232, 235 (2014); Chan & Collins, supra 
note 1, at 507 (“Currently, regulation over reproductive technology by the state and federal 
government is limited. The fertility industry mostly self regulates through nonbinding 
guidelines and suggested ethical practices, though there are various physician licensing 
requirements.” (citations omitted)). For more on state law applying to assisted reproductive 
technology, such as statutes related to fraud, medical malpractice, and consumer protection, see 
SPAR, supra note 1, at 51; Noah, supra note 51, at 615–16. See also John A. Robertson, 
Commerce and Regulation in the Assisted Reproduction Industry, in BABY MARKETS: MONEY 
AND THE NEW POLITICS OF CREATING FAMILIES 191, 203 (Michele Bratcher Goodwin ed., 
2010). 
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assisted reproductive technology to follow.54 
States also decide how the parentage of children who are conceived 
through assisted reproductive technology will be assigned.55 Because 
individual states have their own laws addressing family law and estate 
law, the legal consequences of assisted reproductive technology such as 
inheritance and the legality of surrogacy and other methods of family 
formation are similarly addressed “on a state-by-state basis . . . .”56 The 
next Section of the Article explains why the characterization of the 
regulatory environment surrounding assisted reproductive technology 
as “sparse” is inaccurate when one analyzes the regulation of advanced 
assisted reproductive technologies.57 
A.     The Concept of Subterranean Regulation 
In this Article, I characterize the overlooked regulatory program 
that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration uses to regulate advanced 
assisted reproductive technologies as “subterranean regulation.” This 
concept fits within the larger administrative law scholarship on agency 
“soft law.”58 Within the context of administrative law, much has been 
written about the concept of “regulating by guidance” and other 
informal methods of regulating in which an agency uses informal 
documents to affect the actions of regulated entities.59 Beyond guidance 
 
 54 See Chan & Collins, supra note 1, at 507 (“Currently, regulation over reproductive 
technology by the state and federal government is limited. The fertility industry mostly self 
regulates through nonbinding guidelines and suggested ethical practices, though there are 
various physician licensing requirements.” (citation omitted)). But see CAHN, supra note 1, at 
63, 192–93 (“As the CDC emphasizes, however, the federal government does not provide any 
oversight of these programs, and their standards vary.”). 
 55 See generally KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 24. 
 56 Blake, supra note 16, at 372. The literature related to mitochondrial transfer focuses on 
the legal impacts of the technology on the genetically based parentage scheme in the United 
States and the impacts of the technology on trusts and estate law. See Daar, supra note 16; see, 
e.g., Padmini Cheruvu, Three-Parent IVF and Its Effect on Parental Rights, 6 HASTINGS SCI. & 
TECH. L.J. 73 (2014); Yehezkel Margalit et al., The New Frontier of Advanced Reproductive 
Technology: Reevaluating Modern Legal Parenthood, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 107, 128 (2014); 
see also Steve P. Calandrillo & Chryssa V. Deliganis, In Vitro Fertilization and the Law: How 
Legal and Regulatory Neglect Compromised a Medical Breakthrough, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 311, 330 
(2015) (characterizing state regulation of assisted reproductive technology as similarly 
“undeveloped” in comparison to federal regulation of assisted reproductive technology). 
 57 See JUDITH DAAR, REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 682 (2d ed. 2013) 
(referring to the Fertility Clinic Success Rate of 1992 as “sparse law” when observing, “[t]his 
sparse law in the U.S. can be contrasted with comprehensive regulatory schemes in place in 
other countries”). 
 58 Wu, supra note 19, at 1843–44; see Lars Noah, Governance by the Backdoor: 
Administrative Law(Lessness?) at the FDA, 93 NEB. L. REV. 89, 92 n.9 (2014) (“Guidance 
documents represent a form of ‘soft law.’” (quoting Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: 
Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 576–77 (2008))); Noah, supra note 
19, at 874. 
 59 See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 
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documents, some scholarship has focused on methods that 
administrative agencies use to “threaten” compliance.60 Subterranean 
regulation could be classified as one of these methods of informal 
regulation; however, one notable difference between subterranean 
regulation and other forms of agency “threats” is that the scholarship on 
administrative agency threats often does not direct a significant amount 
of focus to the possibility that administrative agency threats are being 
issued to industries that are not at all within the agency’s jurisdiction. 
Subterranean regulation is characterized by a lack of jurisdiction in 
addition to other procedural weaknesses.61 First, subterranean 
regulation occurs in a regulatory space in which the administrative 
agency, here, the FDA, has not shown that it has jurisdiction over these 
techniques in the first place.62 Thus, while the scholarship on agency 
threats tends to focus on agency threats to “regulated entities” or entities 
that are not currently regulated but clearly fall within the agency’s 
jurisdiction, industries targeted by subterranean regulation are 
threatened in the absence of a regulatory basis for that threat.63 As 
discussed below, this jurisdictional defect in the subterranean regulation 
of AARTs stems partially from the fact that the FDA has similarly not 
cited to any statutory provisions that provide its jurisdiction as 
evidenced by the Agency’s letters issued on July 6, 2001, and subsequent 
regulatory actions and the fact that AARTs do not fit within the larger 
categories of products regulated by the FDA. 
Second, procedurally, subterranean regulation occurs in a manner 
that is different from the standard process that the Agency uses. The 
FDA issues Untitled Letters and Warning Letters to violators of federal 
 
1441 (2004) (“Finally, in an example drawn from contemporary judicial decisionmaking, courts 
appear to be increasingly concerned about the oft-repeated charge that agencies are ‘regulating 
by guidance’—that is, relying on interpretive rules or policy statements instead of legislative 
rules to effectuate their policy judgments.” (citing J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the 
Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J 757, 
781–82 (2003))); see also Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, 
Manuals, and the Like–Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 
1311, 1312 (1992) (“To use such nonlegislative documents to bind the public violates the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and dishonors our system of limited government.”). 
 60 Wu, supra note 19, at 1848–54. 
 61 This Section provides an overview of subterranean regulation whereas the next Section, 
Section II.B, provides detailed specifics on the operation of the concept. 
 62 See discussion infra Section II.B.2. 
 63 Wu, supra note 19, at 1843, 1848–54 (“Regulated entities that are unhappy with a de facto 
regime can and do test the threats, forcing the agency to use its more formal powers and 
therefore invoke judicial review.”) (providing examples of industries in which “threats” have 
been used, notably that of the Federal Communications Commission to broadband providers); 
see also Noah, supra note 19, at 874 (“As used in this Article, administrative ‘armtwisting’ refers 
to a threat by an agency to impose a sanction or withhold a benefit in hopes of encouraging 
‘voluntary’ compliance with a request that the agency could not impose directly on a regulated 
entity.”). 
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law regularly.64 These letters usually have specific citations to statutory 
provisions when issued in the context of food, drugs, and other 
regulated products, along with explanations of how those provisions 
apply to the addressee’s actions or products.65 In other words, in these 
letters, the FDA usually identifies the regulated entities’ actions and then 
explains how those actions violate a specific statutory provision. 
However, the Untitled Letters addressing advanced assisted 
reproductive technologies are not as specific as the FDA’s other Untitled 
Letters. Instead, the letters that the Agency uses to target AARTs are 
characterized by not only brevity and citations to guidance documents 
that may or may not apply to AART providers, but also by a lack of 
specificity. Yet at the same time, these letters are official agency 
communications that are assertions of wrongdoing. The content of the 
FDA’s July 6, 2001 letter to AART providers is located in Appendix A 
and examples of the FDA’s standard practices when issuing Untitled 
and Warning Letters are in Appendices B to D for comparison. 
Third, subterranean regulation is difficult to find. While the 
content of the July 6, 2001 letters is posted online, the addressees are 
not. The addressee line simply states, “Dear Sponsor/Researcher” and 
there is no additional identifying information. Furthermore, I submitted 
a FOIA request to obtain the list of addressees; however, the Agency 
stated that it “did not locate an admin file” for the letter, therefore, it 
was unable to provide me with a list of addressees.66 As a result, it is 
impossible to officially determine how many of these letters were sent or 
to whom they were sent. By reviewing primary sources, including 
transcripts and media accounts, I was able to ascertain some of the 
addressees as they spoke about receiving “the letter,” but it is still 
impossible to ascertain all of the recipients.67 Subsequently in 2013, for 
example, the FDA carried out a similar approach to regulating the 
 
 64 For examples of these letters, see infra Appendices C–D. See also Warning and Untitled 
Letters, supra note 4 (describing the FDA’s use of Untitled Letters and Warning Letters). 
 65 See, e.g., Letter from Robert A. Sausville, Dir. Div. of Case Mgmt., U.S. Food & Drug 
Admin., to Samuel Simons, Regulatory Manager, Protein Scis. Corp. (Mar. 12, 2015),  
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceComplianceRegulatory
Information/ComplianceActivities/Enforcement/UntitledLetters/UCM443161.pdf (“Therefore, 
this material misbrands Flublok under sections 502(a) and 201(n) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) 
and § 321(n), and FDA implementing regulations, Cf. 21 CFR 202.1(e)(6)(i) and (e)(7)(viii).”); 
Letter from Ann Simoneau, Dir. Office of Compliance & Enf’t, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to 
George Katsafados (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/Warning
Letters/2014/ucm416552.htm (“Under section 201(rr) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act (the FD&C Act) (21 U.S.C. § 321(rr)), as amended by the Family Smoking Prevention and 
Tobacco Control Act (Tobacco Control Act), these products are tobacco products because they 
are made or derived from tobacco and intended for human consumption. Certain tobacco 
products, including cigarette tobacco and roll-your-own tobacco, are subject to FDA 
jurisdiction under section 901(b) of the FD&C Act (21 U.S.C. § 387a(b)).”). 
 66 See Email from Ashlee Eswara to author, supra note 6. 
 67 See Meeting #32 Transcript, supra note 8, at 77. 
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actions of an American company providing a new fertility method; that 
letter was also not posted online by the FDA, and I was only able to 
obtain it through a FOIA request.68 In contrast, the example of a “secret 
letter [sent] to various retailers and manufacturers of new ‘bamboo 
clothing,’” cited in Tim Wu’s Agency Threats, was accompanied by a 
footnote that linked to a PDF of the list of recipients, thus implying that 
secret letters sent by other administrative agencies are at least 
traceable.69 
Fourth, subterranean regulation has a “chilling effect” on research. 
Even though the FDA’s subterranean letters do not provide a clear basis 
for the Agency’s jurisdiction, as official statements of wrongdoing, these 
issuances have a chilling effect on research.70 
B.     Thwarted Research and Medical Advancement: The Impacts of 
the FDA’s Subterranean Assertions of Jurisdiction over Advanced Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies 
The FDA has regulated cloning and advanced assisted reproductive 
technologies through letters as opposed to clear, targeted regulations. 
Cloning does not fall within this Article’s definition of advanced assisted 
reproductive technologies since it does not operate in the same manner 
as human reproduction which involves at least two individuals (i.e., an 
intended mother and an intended father).71 
 
 68 See discussion infra Part IV regarding the FOIA Request 2016-4882 and the shareholder 
lawsuit related to OvaScience’s AUGMENT technology. 
 69 See Wu, supra note 19, at 1845. 
 70 For a discussion of the “chilling effect” in the context of abortion rights, see Brandice 
Canes-Wrone & Michael C. Dorf, Measuring the Chilling Effect, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1095, 1096–
98 (2015). “Chilling effect” is a concept that commonly arises in First Amendment 
jurisprudence. Id. 
 71 For the full contents of the letter, see infra Appendix B. But see Cloning, NAT’L HUMAN 
GENOME RES. INST., https://www.genome.gov/25020028/cloning-fact-sheet/#al-8 (last updated 
Mar. 21, 2017) (“Reproductive cloning would present the potential of creating a human that is 
genetically identical to another person who has previously existed or who still exists. This may 
conflict with long-standing religious and societal values about human dignity, possibly 
infringing upon principles of individual freedom, identity and autonomy. However, some argue 
that reproductive cloning could help sterile couples fulfill their dream of parenthood. Others 
see human cloning as a way to avoid passing on a deleterious gene that runs in the family 
without having to undergo embryo screening or embryo selection. Therapeutic cloning, while 
offering the potential for treating humans suffering from disease or injury, would require the 
destruction of human embryos in the test tube. Consequently, opponents argue that using this 
technique to collect embryonic stem cells is wrong, regardless of whether such cells are used to 
benefit sick or injured people.”); see also Human Cloning: How Close Is It?, PBS, https://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/fertility/etc/cloning.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2018). 
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1.     Letters as Assertions of Wrongdoing 
In 1998, the FDA sent a “Dear Colleague Letter” to institutional 
review boards in the United States asserting its jurisdiction over human 
reproductive cloning in reaction to media reports indicating that 
scientists were “contemplating” using human cloning.72 This letter 
noted that clinical research on human cloning “to create a human 
being” could only proceed while an investigational new drug application 
was in effect.73 In 2001, the FDA shifted its focus to advanced assisted 
reproductive technologies, sending letters to sponsors and researchers 
on July 6, 2001 that informed these individuals and entities that the 
FDA had jurisdiction over these technologies, such as cytoplasmic 
transfer.74 The FDA has added mitochondrial transfer, an advanced 
assisted reproductive technology, to the non-exhaustive list of assisted 
reproductive technologies that require FDA pre-approval.75 
 
 72 Issues Raised by Human Cloning Research: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Oversight 
and Investigations of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 78–81 (2001) 
(statement of Kathryn C. Zoon, Dir. of Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation & Research, U.S. Food & 
Drug Admin.) [hereinafter Statement of Kathryn C. Zoon]; Stuart L. Nightingale, Letter About 
Human Cloning, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Oct. 26, 1998), http://www.fda.gov/Science
Research/SpecialTopics/RunningClinicalTrials/ucm150508.htm. The list of addressees is not 
included online for this letter either. Under the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) regulations, “45 CFR part 46, subpart E, [HHS] require[s] all IRBs to register with HHS 
if they will review human subjects research conducted or supported by HHS and are to be 
designated under an assurance of compliance approved for federalwide use (i.e., an FWA) by 
OHRP.” IRB Registration Process Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), HHS.GOV, http://
www.hhs.gov/ohrp/register-irbs-and-obtain-fwas/irb-registration/irb-registration-faq/
index.html# (last visited Mar. 2, 2018). Thus, those pursuing research not supported by the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, as cloning would not be, would possibly not be 
registered with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and thus, not receive the 
letter. 
 73 See Nightingale, supra note 72. 
 74 See Appendix A (providing the FDA’s Letter to Sponsors/Researchers, on the subject of 
cytoplasmic transfer); see also General Responsibilities of Sponsors, 21 C.F.R. § 312.50 (2016) 
(explaining that “sponsor” in FDA terminology signifies that an individual or entity has a 
pending investigational new drug application before the FDA); Meeting #32 Transcript, supra 
note 8, at 47 (“FDA had concerns about whether we understood all the ramifications of this 
procedure and whether we understood its safety in particular, and reacted by sending letters to 
practitioners who were identified by publications on ooplasm [cytoplasm] transfer or by 
advertisements offering the procedure. We advised practitioners that we would now require the 
submission of an investigational new drug application, or IND, to the agency and its 
subsequent review to continue to treat new patients.”). 
 75 See FDA Regulation of Human Cells, supra note 12 (listing “HUMAN CELLS USED IN 
THERAPY INVOLVING THE TRANSFER OF GENETIC MATERIAL (cell nuclei, oocyte 
nuclei, mitochondrial genetic material in ooplasm, genetic material contained in a genetic 
vector)” as products that are “[r]egulated under Section 351 of the [Public Health Service] Act 
and/or the [Food, Drug & Cosmetic] Act” without explaining how the communicable disease 
provision of the Public Health Service Act “and/or” the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act applies 
to these products); see also discussion infra Part II (explaining that the application of the FDA’s 
Human Tissue Regulations to human reproductive tissue is counterintuitive and 
contradictory). 
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2.     Lack of Jurisdiction 
The FDA’s July 6, 2001 letter to sponsors and researchers was the 
first letter that the Agency sent regarding advanced assisted 
reproductive technologies after decades of little involvement in the 
broader field of assisted reproductive technology.76 As noted in the 
Introduction, the July 6, 2001 letter stated “[w]e want to advise you that 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has jurisdiction over human 
cells used in therapy involving the transfer of genetic material by means 
other than the union of gamete nuclei.”77 The letter also listed five FDA 
documents that provided “notice” of this jurisdiction; those documents 
are analyzed in Section II.C.78 Documents, however, do not provide 
notice of jurisdiction, statutes do. Yet, the FDA failed to cite any specific 
statutory provisions that would explain the basis for its jurisdiction over 
advanced assisted reproductive technologies. Moreover, the FDA’s 
broad reference to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, a statute 
of significant length, is insufficient, especially when compared to the 
FDA’s usual practice. 
The FDA’s July 6, 2001 letter provided a list of examples of “the 
transfer of genetic material” and included cytoplasmic transfer in that 
list.79 The letter then stated “[t]he use of such genetically manipulated 
cells (and/or their derivatives) in humans constitutes a clinical 
investigation and requires submission of an Investigational New Drug 
application (IND) to FDA,” although a later sentence in the letter noted 
“[w]e can advise you whether or not your activities require submission 
of an IND.”80 Thus, not only was it counterintuitive that the FDA would 
be asserting jurisdiction over a form of assisted reproductive technology 
at all, but the letter itself contained contradictions. 
Beyond the Agency’s failure to identify the source of its 
jurisdiction, the natural counterargument to an assertion that an agency 
does not have jurisdiction over a specific field or action is one that 
addresses the issue of Chevron deference.81 However, as will be 
 
 76 See discussion infra Section II.C (discussing the evolution of the FDA’s regulations from 
not addressing in vitro fertilization to addressing advanced assisted reproductive technology). 
 77 See infra Appendix A. While the content of the letter is available on the FDA’s website, 
the list of recipients is not. Similarly, a FOIA request revealed that the agency was unable to 
find the file related to the letter; therefore, a list of sponsor/researchers who received the letter 
is not available. 
 78 See infra Appendix A. 
 79 See infra Appendix A (examples listed were “cell nuclei (e.g., for cloning), . . . oocyte 
nuclei, . . . ooplasm [cytoplasm], which contains mitochondrial genetic material, and . . . genetic 
material contained in a genetic vector, transferred into gametes or other cells”). 
 80 See infra Appendix A. 
 81 While Chevron deference is often the first type of deference referred to in the context of 
judicial review of agency decision-making, it is one of many types of deference. See Kevin M. 
Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret Statutes, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 
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explained in Part III, ethical views are not an area in which agencies are 
entitled to Chevron deference. 
3.     Obfuscation of the Evidence of Agency Action 
Furthermore, it is difficult to effectively challenge agency action 
when one does not know the scope of that action. Other scholars of 
administrative law have criticized administrative agency processes for 
issuing “non-substantive” rules, such as guidance documents.82 I agree 
with those criticisms of the shortcomings of the Administrative 
Procedure Act’s application to those rules, including the lack of a 
publicly available administrative record and the difficulty in challenging 
those interpretative rules.83 While non-substantive rules tend to be 
guidance documents, subterranean regulation often exacerbates these 
concerns as one can more easily find the content of guidance documents 
than evidence of the agency’s subterranean regulation. The case of the 
FDA’s regulation of AARTs indicates that absent a FOIA request and a 
FOIA response that is wholly responsive to that request, the public does 
not have comprehensive evidence of the content and the scope of the 
Agency’s subterranean regulation thus rendering subterranean 
regulation more problematic than other forms of agency soft law. 
4.     “Chilling” Effects 
The FDA’s letters to researchers also do not threaten enforcement 
action; however, researchers perceive the letters as threatening. For 
example, one recipient of a letter, Dr. Jamie Grifo, noted, “[w]hat was 
threatening was they couldn’t give me a sense of what the consequences 
would be . . . if I continued. They made it sound as if there would be 
 
871, 878 n.22 (2015) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). Under United 
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234–35 (2001), if Chevron deference is not warranted, the 
agency’s interpretation will be reviewed under Skidmore. 
 82 See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1561–62 (1992) (“The Administrative Procedure Act grants agencies 
virtually complete discretion over the procedures they use to conduct informal adjudication 
and to issue general statements of policy. . . . No requirements of an open record or public 
discussion operate to constrain pure political influence or an agency’s pursuit of a private 
agenda. For statements of policy, the usual justification for the absence of any required 
procedures is the non-binding nature of such statements. From a civic republican perspective, 
however, this justification is inadequate. Subsequent agency adjudicatory proceedings are 
adversarial and hence probably will not cure the lack of opportunities for access and 
deliberation. The adversarial nature of subsequent proceedings will be aggravated by the fact 
that the agency has already committed itself to a position and may be reluctant to consider 
seriously arguments to the contrary.”). 
 83 Id. 
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recourse without saying it. I was very threatened . . . .”84 Dr. Grifo’s work 
actually involved a form of mitochondrial transfer called “pronuclear 
transfer.”85 Other addressees’ work, notably the work of Dr. Jacques 
Cohen at the Saint Barnabas Medical Center and the work of physicians 
at the Jones Institute of Eastern Virginia Medical School, involved the use 
of cytoplasmic transfer.86 These researchers stopped providing 
cytoplasmic transfer in the United States after receiving the FDA’s letter.87 
While not mentioned by the FDA in its letters to researchers, 
substantial penalties may result from violations of the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Public Health Service Act. Penalties for 
violating provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
include: imprisonment for up to one year, a $1,000 fine, or both for 
first-time offenders; enhancements can increase the penalties to up to 
three years imprisonment, a $10,000 fine, or both.88 Similarly, 
individuals who violate the Public Health Service Act face up to one year 
in prison, up to a $100,000 fine (if no death has resulted from the 
violation), or up to a $250,000 fine (if death has resulted from the 
violation).89 Thus, while there was no specific reference to criminal 
penalties in the FDA’s letters to those working on advanced assisted 
reproductive technologies, the specter of punishment still looms. 
FDA employee statements in other venues reveal that the Agency is 
troubled by the spread of advanced assisted reproductive technologies, 
and in the case of cytoplasmic transfer, targeted the technology before 
the results had been officially published.90 Clinical use of cytoplasmic 
 
 84 Connor, supra note 12. 
 85 Id. 
 86 See Meeting #32 Transcript, supra note 8, at 46. 
 87 See id. 
 88 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 333(a)(1)– 333(a)(2) (2012) (providing that if an individual violates 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act “after a conviction of him under this [same] section has 
become final, or commits such a violation with the intent to defraud or mislead, such person 
shall be imprisoned for not more than three years or fined not more than $10,000, or both”). 
 89 See Eligibility Determination for Donors of Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and 
Tissue-Based Products, 69 Fed. Reg. 29785, 29788 (May 25, 2004) (also stating that 
“organizational defendants [face] fines [that] range up to $200,000 [if no death has resulted 
from the violation] and $500,000 [if death has resulted from the violation]”); see also Eligibility 
Determination for Donors of Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products, 
66 Fed. Reg. 5447, 5449 (Jan. 19, 2001) (The agency’s 2001 final rule stated “[a]uthority for 
enforcement of section 361 of the PHS Act is provided by section 368 of the PHS Act (42 U.S.C. 
271). Under section 368(a) of the PHS Act, any person who violates a regulation prescribed 
under section 361 of the PHS Act may be punished by imprisonment for up to 1 year. 
Individuals may also be punished for violating such a regulation by a fine of up to $100,000 if 
death has not resulted from the violation or up to $250,000 if death has resulted (18 U.S.C. 3559 
and 3571(c)).”). 
 90 See Meeting #32 Transcript, supra note 8, at 46–47 (Deborah Hursh, a cellular product 
reviewer for the FDA stated at a 2002 Advisory Committee meeting that the agency “was 
already considering action in the area of ooplasm transfer” at the time of Dr. Cohen’s 
publication and that the agency felt that the use of cytoplasmic transfer was “beginning to 
spread rapidly into clinical practice in the United States by 2001.” Dr. Hursh’s introduction also 
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transfer in the United States ended after the FDA sent its 2001 letters.91 
This not only had a negative impact on medical advancement, but it also 
reduced the incentive for physicians to undertake follow-up studies, 
which already encounter difficulty in keeping patients.92 
Subterranean regulatory actions deter investment in the 
biosciences. Even though assisted reproductive technology is usually 
one industry that needs less investment due to the willingness of couples 
to spend large sums of money to have a child genetically related to them, 
funding is crucial.93 For example, mitochondrial transfer, although an 
advanced assisted reproductive technology, was developed by Dr. 
Shoukhrat Mitalipov in a university laboratory.94 As a university 
researcher as opposed to a physician, Dr. Mitalipov would not 
necessarily have patients willing to spend large sums of money to have a 
genetically related child.95 Federal funding is unavailable for embryo 
research, which leaves private investment as a primary funding source 
for human clinical studies.96 However, investors also dislike unclear 
regulatory frameworks: “Without a clear and rapid regulatory pathway, 
Mitalipov says, he is unable to get the investment that he needs to 
pursue clinical work [related to mitochondrial transfer].”97 
 
noted that three clinics had “published on this procedure and [the] FDA [was] able to find five 
additional clinics that were advertising this procedure on the internet.” As a result, the agency 
“advised practitioners that [it] would now require the submission of an investigational new 
drug application, or IND, to the agency and its subsequent review to continue to treat new 
patients.” (emphasis added)). 
 91 See June Carbone, Negating the Genetic Tie: Does the Law Encourage Unnecessary Risks?, 
79 UMKC L. REV. 333, 348 (2010) (“The FDA’s assertion of jurisdiction was of dubious validity, 
but since the clinic chose not to challenge it, the result has effectively shut down research and 
use of the procedure in the United States.”); Meeting #32 Transcript, supra note 8, at 48–55 
(providing the testimony of Dr. Susan Lazendorff of the Jones Institute for Reproductive 
Medicine at the Eastern Virginia Medical School: “We were also looking at other things when 
we were doing these studies and before we received our letter to stop doing them.”). 
 92 See Rachel Nolan, Behind the Cover Story: Kim Tingley on the Promise and Problems of 
Three-Parent I.V.F., N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://6thfloor.blogs.nytimes.com/
2014/06/30/kim-tingley-on-the-perplexity-and-promise-of-three-parent-i-v-f; Pritchard, supra 
note 25 (“Due to a lack of funding, Cohen says, it hasn’t been possible to find out about how 
any of the children like Alana who were born from cytoplasmic transfer are doing. But the St[.] 
Barnab[a]s Institute is now starting a follow up study to check their progress.”); see also 
Meeting #32 Transcript, supra note 8, at 123–24 (“So, we have been able to do follow-up in 13 
of the 17 babies. However, more recently it is more likely that some of them will refuse further 
investigations by us. This is not just this particular group. That is common for all infertility 
follow-up, that you lose sight of these patients. Some of them will move and not even leave a 
return address.”). 
 93 See SPAR, supra note 1. 
 94 See Tavernise, supra note 13. 
 95 See SPAR, supra note 1, at xiv. 
 96 See I. Glenn Cohen & Eli Y. Adashi, Preventing Mitochondrial DNA Diseases: One Step 
Forward, Two Steps Back, 316 JAMA 273 (2016). 
 97 See David Cyranoski & Boer Deng, Stem-Cell Star Lands in Same Venture as Disgraced 
Cloner, NATURE (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.nature.com/news/stem-cell-star-lands-in-same-
venture-as-disgraced-cloner-1.16907 (also noting “[t]he US-based scientist who first cloned 
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The FDA’s unclear regulatory pathway has halted research at the 
expense of follow-up studies on those already born as a result of 
advanced assisted reproductive technologies, and it has also halted the 
human clinical use of advanced assisted reproductive technologies. 
Although more than fifteen years have passed since its assertion of 
jurisdiction over cytoplasmic transfer, the FDA has provided no clear 
explanation of the source of its jurisdiction over advanced assisted 
reproductive technologies (which manifests through the requirement of 
premarket approval) or why this divergence from the Agency’s “hands-
off” treatment of conventional assisted reproductive technology is 
justified. 
C.     Drugs Versus Procedures: What the FDA Does and Does Not 
Regulate 
The FDA regulates food, drugs, tobacco products, pharmaceuticals, 
medical devices, biological products, and cosmetics.98 The FDA does not 
regulate the practice of medicine, which means that while it regulates 
the tools that physicians use in surgery (e.g., anesthesia, surgical 
implants such as pacemakers, bone grafts, prosthetics, etc.) or in their 
general practices (e.g., vaccines and prescription drugs), the FDA does 
not regulate surgical techniques or diagnostic decisions.99 
The drugs and medical devices used by treatments categorized as 
“assisted reproductive technology” are regulated by the FDA, but the 
techniques used in assisted reproductive technology themselves are not 
regulated by the FDA. The exception to this regulatory convention lies 
in the FDA’s regulation of advanced assisted reproductive technologies. 
For example, hormones, which are commonly referred to as “fertility 
drugs” have been described as one of the “most basic components” of 
assisted reproductive technology, and they are regulated by the FDA like 
all pharmaceuticals.100 Similarly, while sperm and eggs used in assisted 
 
human embryonic stem cells is taking steps to apply his reproductive technology in China to 
escape burdensome regulations and get funding. The result is a joint venture that brings stem-
cell star Shoukhrat Mitalipov of Oregon Health and Science University in Portland together 
with disgraced cloner turned dog-clone entrepreneur, Woo Suk Hwang, although Mitalipov 
says that the pair will not collaborate on research”). 
 98 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 341–46, 387a–r (2012); see also What Does FDA Regulate?, supra note 
22. 
 99 See What Does FDA Regulate?, supra note 22. The term “bone grafts” refers to the bone 
that is grafted and not the procedure itself. 
 100 See SPAR, supra note 1, at 35 (noting that the “most basic components” of the fertility 
trade are “sperm, eggs, and hormones” and referring to what are commonly referred to as 
hormonal treatments as “fertility drugs”); see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 201, 355; see, e.g., Infertility 
Medications, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N (May 16, 2017, 7:33 AM), http://americanpregnancy.org/
infertility/infertility-medications (providing an overview of many of the hormonal treatments 
that are a part of fertility treatment in the United States). 
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reproductive technology and advanced assisted reproductive technology 
have, since 2001, been subject to the FDA’s communicable disease 
requirements, analyzed below in Section II.D, the FDA does not 
approve how those sperm and eggs are obtained, and the FDA does not 
prohibit the use of all sperm and eggs in assisted reproductive 
technology that can transmit communicable diseases.101 
New drugs may not be introduced into interstate commerce 
“unless an approval of an application . . . is effective with respect to 
[that] drug.”102 Drugs are “articles intended for use in the diagnosis, 
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other 
animals; and . . . articles (other than food) intended to affect the 
structure or any function of the body of man or other animals . . . .”103 
Thus, surgeries, for example, are not drugs. Practitioners and 
researchers describe AARTs as “research protocol[s],” and not drugs, 
when explaining why AARTs are outside of the jurisdiction of the 
FDA.104 Because the definition of drug includes the word “article” and 
not “research protocol,” AARTs are analogous to surgeries and not 
drugs. Similarly, methods used in assisted reproduction such as in vitro 
fertilization and artificial insemination are not subject to FDA 
approval.105 Thus, because AARTs are techniques that use drugs and 
medical devices, just like other forms of assisted reproductive 
technology, AARTs should not be subject to federal regulation.106 
Additionally, while other scholarly articles have noted that cytoplasmic 
transfer could be seen as a “cure” for the disease of infertility, women 
who would use mitochondrial transfer are not infertile.107 
 
 101 See discussion infra Section II.D (providing information on the FDA’s Human Cellular 
and Tissue-Based Products Rule in the context of sexually intimate partners). For more on the 
procurement and trade of sperm and eggs, see generally CAHN, supra note 1. 
 102 21 U.S.C. § 355; see also MITOCHONDRIAL REPLACEMENT TECHNIQUES, supra note 29, at 
64–65 (discussing the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the process through which a proposed 
drug eventually gains FDA approval for sale in the United States: If an investigational new drug 
application is authorized, then a researcher may begin clinical investigations. After successful 
clinical investigations, a researcher (or company) may submit “a Biologic License 
Application . . . or a New Drug Application . . . .” That application is then reviewed by the FDA 
which decides whether to approve the drug.). 
 103 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(g)(1)(B)–(C). 
 104 Meeting #32 Transcript, supra note 8, at 280–81. 
 105 See What Is Assisted Reproductive Technology?, CENTERS DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/art/whatis.html (last updated Feb. 7, 2017). 
 106 See Michael J. Malinowski, A Law-Policy Proposal to Know Where Babies Come from 
During the Reproduction Revolution, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 549, 554–55 (2006). 
 107 See Kerry L. Macintosh, Brave New Eugenics: Regulating Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies in the Name of Better Babies, 2010 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 257, 259 (2010). 
Thus, to the extent that other forms of assisted reproductive technology could arguably be 
considered a “cure” for infertility, thus rendering them analogous to a drug, mitochondrial 
transfer does not cure a mother’s infertility as she would be able to reproduce without the use 
of assisted reproductive technology. See supra text accompanying note 103 (providing the 
definition of a drug). 
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“Biological products,” also referred to as “biologics” are a broad 
category of products regulated by the FDA.108 A biological product is “a 
virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood 
component or derivative, allergenic product, protein . . . or analogous 
product, . . . arsphenamine or derivative of arsphenamine, . . . applicable 
to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human 
beings.”109 So while organ transplants are not regulated by the FDA, 
“[b]lood and processed blood derivatives, such as plasma and clotting 
factors,” are regulated by the FDA under the Public Health Service 
Act.110 
The FDA has stated that advanced assisted reproductive 
technologies would be regulated “as drugs and/or biological products,” 
but it is unclear why that is the case.111 Similarly, the FDA has used this 
tactic in spite of the legal argument that cytoplasmic transfer and 
mitochondrial transfer are not drugs, but medical techniques which do 
not fall under the Agency’s jurisdiction.112 The FDA should clearly 
explain the source of its jurisdiction (if any) over advanced assisted 
reproductive technologies and how that jurisdiction corresponds with 
the manner in which advanced assisted reproductive technologies will 
be regulated. In light of the blurring distinctions between medical 
devices, human tissues, drugs, and the practice of medicine, if the FDA 
does have jurisdiction over advanced assisted reproductive technologies, 
it should clearly explain the source of that jurisdiction, not only to 
regulate more clearly, but also because the Agency’s jurisdiction over 
biotechnology will continue to be contested as scientists continue to 
innovate and move from using pharmaceuticals to treat conditions, to 
using them to prevent conditions ex ante while employing techniques 
that target genes. 
D.     The Gradual Inclusion of Reproductive Tissue into FDA 
 
 108 See 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2012). 
 109 Id. 
 110 PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1154 (4th ed. 
2014) (noting that “[a] relatively small share of blood is used in the form in which it was 
collected, i.e., as single units transfused into individual patients. Here the risk of disease 
transmission is confined; only the recipient of a contaminated unit of blood is potentially 
vulnerable. But most blood is fractionated, pooled, and processed to yield a variety of useful 
products”). For statutory provisions governing organ transplantation, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 273–74. 
 111 FDA Regulation of Human Cells, supra note 12; see also HUTT ET AL., supra note 110, at 
672. This dual designation may stem from the FDA’s efforts to regulate products that fall within 
both categories of its regulations; however, the agency has not even issued a clarification as to 
which FDA regulatory center would review applications by those wishing to use advanced 
assisted reproductive technologies clinically. Furthermore, there has still been no clear 
explanation as to how an advanced assisted reproductive technology would be a drug or a 
biologic. 
 112 See Meeting #32 Transcript, supra note 8, at 280. 
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Regulations 
Over time, the FDA has increased the number of agency-issued 
rules that apply to human reproductive tissue and advanced assisted 
reproductive technologies. The FDA’s July 6, 2001 letter to 
sponsors/researchers referenced five documents that the FDA 
characterized as providing “notice of the applicability of [investigational 
new drug] requirements to cellular and tissue-based products . . . .”113 
These five documents were: two guidance documents, one final rule, 
and two proposed rules.114 However, a close examination of these five 
documents reveals that notice is non-existent in some of those 
documents and unclear in the others. 
Assisted reproductive technology, which includes not only in vitro 
fertilization but also artificial insemination, had been used by American 
physicians for over fifty years before the FDA began regulating 
reproductive tissue.115 In 1993, the FDA issued a document entitled, 
“Application of Current Statutory Authorities to Human Somatic Cell 
Therapy Products and Gene Therapy Products.”116 This document, 
while cited in the July 6, 2001 FDA letter, did not state that the FDA 
would be regulating advanced assisted reproductive technologies or 
 
 113 See infra Appendix A. 
 114 Id. The five documents were: (1) a 1993 Federal Register notice entitled, “Application of 
Current Statutory Authorities to Human Somatic Cell Therapy Products and Gene Therapy 
Products,” 58 Fed. Reg. 53,248 (Oct. 14, 1993); (2) the FDA’s “comprehensive regulatory 
program for the regulation of human cellular and tissue-based products, based on a tiered, risk-
based assessment,” infra Appendix A; see Proposed Approach to Regulation of Cellular and 
Tissue-Based Products; Availability and Public Meeting, 62 Fed. Reg. 9721 (Mar. 4, 1997); (3) 
“[a] final rule that establishes the criteria for regulation of human cells, tissues, and cellular and 
tissue based products (HCT/Ps), including reproductive cells and tissues,” infra Appendix A; 
see Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products; Establishment Registration 
and Listing, 66 Fed. Reg. 5447 (Jan. 19, 2001); (4) a 1999 proposed rule entitled, “Suitability 
Determination for Donors of Human Cellular and Tissue-Based Products,” 64 Fed. Reg. 52,696 
(proposed Sept. 30, 1999); and (5) a 2001 proposed rule entitled, “Current Good Tissue Practice 
for Manufacturers of Human Cellular and Tissue-Based Products; Inspection and 
Enforcement,” 66 Fed. Reg. 1508 (proposed Jan. 8, 2001). 
 115 It is estimated that the “popular use” of artificial insemination in the United States began 
in the 1940s. See NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, CLONING HUMAN BEINGS 5 (1997) 
[hereinafter CLONING HUMAN BEINGS] (“Artificial insemination by donor, for example, was 
considered a form of adultery when first introduced in the 1940s. It is now a widely used and 
accepted practice in the treatment of infertility, although some continue to have serious 
reservations.”); Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A Close Look 
at Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1035, 1060–72 (2002); see also The US’ First Test 
Tube Baby, PBS, http://ec2-184-73-243-168.compute-1.amazonaws.com/wgbh/american
experience/features/general-article/babies-americas-first (last visited Mar. 1, 2018) (noting that 
Elizabeth Carr, the first baby born as a result of in vitro fertilization in the United States, was 
born in 1981). 
 116 See Application of Current Statutory Authorities to Human Somatic Cell Therapy 
Products and Gene Therapy Products, 58 Fed. Reg. 53,248. 
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mention reproductive tissue at all.117 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Timeline of the Increasing Federal Regulation of 
AARTs118 
 
In 1997, when the FDA issued a “Proposed Approach to the 
Regulation of Cellular and Tissue-Based Products,” the FDA noted that 
the Agency “ha[d] not previously regulated reproductive tissues.”119 The 
Federal Register notice for the 1997 Proposed Approach stated that the 
FDA’s regulatory framework would include reproductive tissues.120 
However, the actual document providing the approach stated that the 
FDA “would recommend, but not require, that screening and testing 
procedures be followed when reproductive tissues are used between 
sexually intimate partners . . . .”121 Thus, the FDA’s regulation of 
reproductive tissue began with confusion. Ultimately, the 1997 “Human 
 
 117 Id. 
 118 The dates in this timeline are a compilation of several sources cited in this Article. See 
supra note 115 and accompanying text (regarding artificial insemination); see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 264 (2012); Meeting #32 Transcript, supra note 8, at 280–81; US’ First Test Tube Baby, supra 
note 115 (referring to the birth of Elizabeth Carr in 1981); supra note 49 (describing the 1992 
Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act). For more on the gradual increase of federal 
regulations applicable to assisted reproductive technology and AARTs, see infra text 
accompanying notes 119–23 (regarding the 1997 document, a “Proposed Approach to 
Regulation of Cellular and Tissue-Based Products” and the 1999 document “Suitability 
Determination for Donors of Human Cellular and Tissue-Based Products”). 
 119 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PROPOSED APPROACH TO REGULATION OF CELLULAR AND 
TISSUE-BASED PRODUCTS 9 (1997) [hereinafter FDA PROPOSED APPROACH]. 
 120 See Proposed Approach to Regulation of Cellular and Tissue-Based Products; Availability 
and Public Meeting, 62 Fed. Reg. 9721 (Mar. 4, 1997). 
 121 FDA PROPOSED APPROACH, supra note 119. 
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Tissue Intended for Transplantation” rule specifically excluded “semen 
or other reproductive tissue.”122 
In 1999, the FDA flipped from not regulating reproductive tissue to 
proposing a rule that would require the application of communicable 
disease testing requirements to facilities that work with reproductive 
tissue. The proposed “Suitability Determination for Donors of Human 
Cellular and Tissue-Based Products” rule would mandate 
communicable disease testing for many types of human tissue including 
semen.123 The FDA explained that because human cell, tissue, and 
cellular and tissue-based products (which the agency refers to as 
“HCT/Ps”) are derived from the human body, there is a risk that these 
“products” could transmit communicable diseases.124 As the basis for its 
HCT/P regulations, the FDA cited to Section 361 of the Public Health 
Service Act which allows the FDA, by delegation, to make regulations to 
prohibit the transmission or spread of communicable diseases.125 As a 
result, under the final rule, facilities that perform work on reproductive 
tissues must continue to adhere to requirements related to the testing of 
communicable diseases with exceptions for those facilities that are using 
the reproductive tissue of sexually intimate partners.126 
 
 122 See Human Tissue Intended for Transplantation, 62 Fed. Reg. 40,429, 40,444 (July 29, 
1997). 
 123 See Statement of Kathryn C. Zoon, supra note 72. The 1999 Suitability Determination for 
Donors of Human Cellular and Tissue-Based Products proposed rule cited in the July 6, 2001 
letter became a final rule in 2004. However, in response to a public comment, the name of the 
final rule was changed to “Eligibility Determination for Donors of Human Cells, Tissues, and 
Cellular and Tissue-Based Products,” 69 Fed. Reg. 29,786 (May 25, 2005). The final rule covers 
many types of human tissue: reproductive tissue including embryos, semen, and eggs; cord 
blood; ocular tissue such as cornea donations through eye banks; and human “heart valves.” Id. 
at 29,817, 29,787 (“We are issuing these new regulations under the authority of section 361 of 
the [Public Health Service] Act (42 U.S.C. 264).”). 
 124 See Eligibility Determination for Donors of Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and 
Tissue-Based Products, 69 Fed. Reg. at 29,787; Donor Eligibility Final Rule and Guidance 
Questions and Answers, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBlood
Vaccines/TissueTissueProducts/QuestionsaboutTissues/ucm102842.htm (last updated Apr. 20, 
2009) (citing to Section 351 of the Public Health Service Act in reference to a biological product 
application). 
 125 See 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2012); Donor Eligibility Final Rule and Guidance Questions and 
Answers, supra note 124; see also Eligibility Determination for Donors of Human Cells, Tissues, 
and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products, 69 Fed. Reg. at 29,788. 
 126 See Eligibility Determination for Donors of Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and 
Tissue-Based Products, 69 Fed. Reg. at 29,793 (“We have also clarified the definition by noting 
that directed reproductive donors do not include sexually intimate donors, who are excepted 
from screening and testing requirements under § 1271.90.”) Anonymous semen donations 
remain subject to the testing requirement and six-month retesting requirement. The FDA 
attributes the distinction in the regulatory treatment of anonymous semen donors and sexually 
intimate partners to the Agency’s “respect [of] the existence of relationships between people 
who know each other and have made a joint decision for the recipient to conceive a child.” Id. 
at 29,790, 29,793 (noting that facilities working with the reproductive tissue of sexually intimate 
partners are not excepted from administrative requirements such as labeling and registration 
when semen from a directed donor is frozen before insemination due to “concerns about 
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The FDA’s 2001 HCT/P regulations are the basis for the FDA’s 
theory that the results of advanced assisted reproductive technologies 
are “drugs.”127 The FDA’s tissue regulation framework conceptually 
distinguishes between “minimally manipulated” tissue and “more than 
minimally manipulated” tissue.128 “Minimal manipulation” is: 
“processing that does not alter the original relevant characteristics of the 
tissue relating to the tissue’s utility for reconstruction, repair, or 
replacement . . . [or] the relevant biological characteristics of cells or 
tissues.”129 
The regulations do not define what the term “original relevant 
characteristics” means and despite public comments that the term 
“minimal manipulation” is vague and should be eliminated, the FDA 
kept the term.130 Tissues that are minimally manipulated are “lightly 
regulated” and subject to communicable disease testing requirements, 
whereas “more than minimally” manipulated human cells and tissue 
products are regulated as drugs and/or biologics.131 Not only is it 
 
possible cross-contamination during storage”). The fifth document referenced in the July 6, 
2001 letter infra Appendix A, “Current Good Tissue Practice for Manufacturers of Human 
Cellular and Tissue-Based Products; Inspection and Enforcement,” also provides requirements 
to minimize the transmission of communicable diseases within facilities. 66 Fed. Reg. 1508 
(Jan. 8, 2001). The final rule, “Current Good Tissue Practice for Human Cell, Tissue, and 
Cellular and Tissue-Based Product Establishments; Inspection and Enforcement” was published 
on November 24, 2004 with an effective date of May 25, 2005. 69 Fed. Reg. 68,611 (Nov. 24, 
2004).  
 127 See Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products; Establishment 
Registration and Listing, 66 Fed. Reg. 5447 (Jan. 19, 2001); Tissue and Tissue Product Questions 
and Answers, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/Tissue
TissueProducts/QuestionsaboutTissues/ucm101559.htm (last updated Feb. 2, 2018); 
MITOCHONDRIAL REPLACEMENT TECHNIQUES, supra note 29, at 22; see also 21 C.F.R. 
§ 1271.3(d) (2016). Blood, blood products, and blood vessels are excluded from the agency’s 
HCT/P regulations. The 2001 Human Tissue Regulations do not apply to human organs such as 
kidneys, livers, hearts, and lungs as they are regulated by the Health Resources Services 
Administration, another operating division of the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services. Id. 
 128 See Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products; Establishment 
Registration and Listing, 66 Fed. Reg. at 5457. 
 129 Id. at 5467. 
 130 Id. at 5457 (“Eight comments asserted that ‘minimal manipulation’ is vague and open to 
subjective interpretation, and should be eliminated. Two comments asserted that it is difficult 
to draw a meaningful distinction between tissues that are minimally manipulated and those that 
are more than minimally manipulated. One of these comments suggested that instead of the 
minimal manipulation criterion, FDA should propose that tissue products labeled or promoted 
for tissue replacement, reconstruction, or restoration of function be regulated as tissue. 
Another comment requested the development of guidance and noted that, in light of future 
technological advances, a broader definition of minimal manipulation may be more 
appropriate.”). 
 131 See Collins, supra note 49 (showing the impact of the FDA’s regulatory scheme on federal 
funding and the acceptance of the FDA’s view by other agencies within the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services: “The Public Health Service Act and the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act give the FDA the authority to regulate cell and gene therapy products as 
biological products and/or drugs, which would include oversight of human germline 
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unclear what more than minimal manipulation is, it is also unclear how 
the FDA’s ability to require communicable disease screening under the 
Public Health Service Act mandates that a “modified embryo” or more 
than minimally manipulated reproductive tissue be treated as a “drug 
and/or biologic.”132 
The FDA’s HCT/P regulations are based on the Agency’s delegated 
communicable disease testing authority under the Public Health Service 
Act; however, it is unclear how communicable disease testing 
requirements can prohibit the clinical use of AARTs.133 While 
communicable disease testing for public health purposes is an 
undisputed part of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ 
 
modification. During development, biological products may be used in humans only if an 
investigational new drug application is in effect (21 CFR Part 312).”); see also U.S. DEP’T.  
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MINIMAL MANIPULATION OF HUMAN 
CELLS, TISSUES, AND CELLULAR AND TISSUE-BASED PRODUCTS: DRAFT GUIDANCE (2014), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceComplianceRegulatory
Information/Guidances/CellularandGeneTherapy/UCM427746.pdf; MITOCHONDRIAL 
REPLACEMENT TECHNIQUES, supra note 29, at 2–27. 
 132 See MITOCHONDRIAL REPLACEMENT TECHNIQUES, supra note 29, at 65. In 2013, the FDA 
sent a letter to OvaScience, a Massachusetts-based company, stating that the company needed 
to submit an investigational new drug application to continue its work on “Augment,” a 
technology that uses a woman’s own mitochondria to revitalize her eggs which are then used in 
in vitro fertilization. This letter, obtained through FOIA Request 2016-4882, stated, on the 
subject of “more than minimal manipulation”: 
[O]ur understanding is that your autologous mitochondrial transfer product, 
AUGMENT, consists of cells isolated from a biopsy of ovarian tissue, which are 
processed to extract mitochondria that are then introduced into other reproductive 
tissues during the IVF process. The removal of mitochondria and introduction into 
other reproductive tissue appears to be more than minimal manipulation. This is 
based on the limited information available; please note that the addition of 
mitochondrial DNA to other reproductive tissue may raise additional regulatory 
concerns. 
Letter from Celia M. Witten to Alison Lawton, supra note 7; see Complaint at 2, Ratner v. 
OvaScience, No. 13-cv-12286 (D. Mass. Sept. 16, 2013) (“Throughout the Class Period, 
Ova[S]cience represented to the FDA and investors that it believed that Augment qualified for 
designation as a 361 HCT/P, which allows human cellular and tissue based products to be 
tested and marketed without FDA licensure. Under FDA guidelines, organisms can only 
achieve this designation if they are ‘only minimally manipulated’, i.e., the process does not alter 
‘the relevant biological characteristics of the cells or tissue.’ . . . Ultimately, the FDA rejected 
Ova[S]cience’s faulty designation. On September 10, 2013, the Company disclosed that it was 
suspending enrollment of AUGMENT in the U.S. after receiving an ‘untitled’ letter from the 
FDA ‘questioning the status of AUGMENT as a 361 HCT/P and advising the Company to file 
an Investigational New Drug (IND) application.’”); see also Bioentrepreneur, CRISPR Germline 
Editing Reverberates Through Biotech Community, NATURE.COM: TRADESECRETS (Apr. 30, 
2015, 12:34 AM), http://blogs.nature.com/tradesecrets/2015/04/30/crispr-germline-editing-
reverberates-through-biotech-community (noting that Augment is available in the United 
Kingdom, Canada, Dubai, and Turkey, but not in the United States); HUTT ET AL., supra note 
110, at 672. 
 133 See 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2012); Eligibility Determination for Donors of Human Cells, Tissues, 
and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products; Final Rule and Notice, 69 Fed. Reg. 29,786, 29,787 
(May 25, 2004); Donor Eligibility Final Rule and Guidance Questions and Answers, supra note 
124. 
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jurisdiction (and by delegation, the FDA’s), the FDA’s regulation of 
reproductive tissues has expanded beyond communicable disease testing 
requirements.134 Regulating manipulated cells and tissues utilized in 
advanced assisted reproductive technology as drugs exceeds the power 
to regulate communicable diseases. Neither interstate commerce nor 
international commerce would affect the transmission or spread of 
defective mitochondria or defective genes. If genetic diseases did 
somehow fall within the Agency’s authority to prevent the spread of 
communicable diseases under the Public Health Service Act, the 
Agency’s letters have thwarted efforts to prevent the transmission of 
disease-causing genetic mutations to offspring. 
In none of the five documents cited by the FDA in its July 6, 2001 
letter did the FDA clearly explain how these documents connected to 
the Agency’s enabling statutes and how the Agency’s statutory authority 
enabled it to prevent the use of technology that modified DNA in 
reproduction. Some of the cited documents stated that the FDA did not 
regulate reproductive tissue, whereas others provided regulations 
related to reproductive tissue. Others were “guidance documents,” 
which do not provide legal requirements.135 In those documents that did 
provide legal requirements, the Agency broadly cited to Section 361 of 
the Public Health Service Act and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act generally. Yet, the authority to inhibit the spread of communicable 
disease is not the same as the authority to regulate genetic 
modifications. Moreover, the applicability of the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act, if any, was not explained. 
Not only is the regulatory framework surrounding advanced 
assisted reproductive technologies unclear, but the manner of regulating 
these technologies is unique as compared to other more traditional 
forms of assisted reproductive technology. To the FDA, advanced 
assisted reproductive technologies differ from “more traditional” 
methods of assisted reproductive technology because they involve the 
use of more than minimally manipulated tissue.136 But why does a 
 
 134 See 42 U.S.C. § 264; FDA PROPOSED APPROACH, supra note 119, at 8–9; see also HUTT ET 
AL., supra note 110, at 77 (explaining that the FDA shares the power to prevent the spread of 
communicable diseases with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention). 
 135 See Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and Informal Modes of Administrative 
Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 159, 168 (2000) (“At the same time, the FDA takes pains to state 
that guidance documents ‘are not legally binding on the public or the agency. Rather, they 
explain how the agency believes the statutes and regulations apply to certain regulated 
activities.’ Indeed, the FDA remains open to discussing ‘[a]lternative methods that comply with 
the [applicable] statute or regulations . . . .’ In short, guidance documents are meant to be 
statements of no legal consequence but immense practical consequence about virtually 
everything the agency regulates.” (quoting The Food and Drug Administration’s Development, 
Issuance, and Use of Guidance Documents, 62 Fed. Reg. 8961, 8967 (Feb. 27, 1997))). 
 136  “Traditional” assisted reproductive technology, meaning assisted reproductive 
technology such as in vitro fertilization not involving genetic modifications or artificial 
insemination, remain “minimally regulated” by the FDA, whereas AARTs are heavily regulated. 
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change of 0.054% of total DNA, such as occurs in mitochondrial 
transfer, result in a classification of more than minimal manipulation? 
The FDA has not answered this question and declined requests to use a 
term that was not “vague” and “misleading” such as “more than 
minimal manipulation.”137 In light of the fact that only 0.054% of an 
embryo’s DNA is modified as a result of mitochondrial transfer, it 
appears that at the very least, the term “minimal manipulation” should 
be replaced with “manipulation.” 
There are additional questions related to the regulatory treatment 
of human reproductive tissue as a “drug” or “biologic.” If a “modified 
embryo” is a drug, does that mean that a child born as a result of an 
advanced assisted reproductive technology is a “drug”? How long are 
future humans “drugs” or at what point do modified embryos become 
humans and not drugs?138 At some point, in theory, a child born as a 
result of advanced assisted reproductive technology must pass from 
being a “drug” into being a nonregulated entity, but it is unclear when 
that occurs. 
III.     THE ETHICAL CONCERNS THAT SILENTLY IMPACT THE FDA’S 
REGULATORY ACTIONS RELATED TO ADVANCED ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES 
 
When the FDA regulates advanced assisted reproductive 
technologies in a subterranean manner, ethical concerns can fuse with 
safety concerns.139 In written communications, the FDA has not 
 
See supra note 1 and accompanying text (regarding the regulation of traditional assisted 
reproductive technology); supra text accompanying note 129 (providing the definition of 
“minimal manipulation”). 
 137 See supra note 130 and accompanying text (providing public comments on the FDA’s 
HCT/P regulations). 
 138 See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (2012) (defining “drugs” as “articles intended for use in the 
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals; 
and . . . articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of 
man or other animals”). But see LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (2017) (“A viable in vitro fertilized 
human ovum is a juridical person which shall not be intentionally destroyed by any natural or 
other juridical person or through the actions of any other such person. An in vitro fertilized 
human ovum that fails to develop further over a thirty-six hour period except when the embryo 
is in a state of cryopreservation, is considered non-viable and is not considered a juridical 
person.”). See Letter from Mary A. Malarkey, Dir., Office of Compliance & Biologics Quality, 
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to John Zhang, Chief Exec. Officer, Darwin Life, Inc. & New Hope 
Fertility Ctr. (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/BiologicsBloodVaccines/Guidance
ComplianceRegulatoryInformation/ComplianceActivities/Enforcement/UntitledLetters/
UCM570225.pdf (referring to “genetically modified embryo[s]”). 
 139 See Connor, supra note 12 (Dr. Grifo stated with “it”—in the subsequent statement—
referring to pronuclear transfer, a type of mitochondrial transfer: “I stopped it because the FDA 
stopped me for safety concerns. Initially they said it was because it was cloning, which they 
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indicated that the science surrounding advanced assisted reproductive 
technologies is misunderstood.140 Yet some statements by FDA officials 
in public settings indicate that safety or scientific comprehension are 
not driving the FDA’s decisions related to AARTs; if that is indeed the 
case, then other considerations must be driving the FDA’s subterranean 
actions. I argue that these “other considerations” that drive the FDA’s 
subterranean regulation of AARTs include ethical concerns and political 
opposition to advanced assisted reproductive technologies. 
While FDA employees acknowledge that ethical concerns can 
affect regulatory actions, the Agency generally avoids discussing or 
identifying those ethical concerns. At the 2014 FDA Cellular, Tissue, 
and Gene Therapies Advisory Committee meeting, an FDA employee 
stated that “[t]he FDA recognizes [that there are] moral, ethical, and 
social policy issues related to genetic modification of eggs and embryos, 
and that these issues have the potential to affect regulatory decisions.”141 
But in spite of their ability to affect regulatory decisions, the Agency 
continually refuses to discuss these issues. In 2014—at the same 
Advisory Committee meeting on mitochondrial transfer where an 
agency employee admitted that ethical concerns can influence agency 
actions—the Agency purposefully limited the scope of the meeting to 
animal trials and general safety concerns, but not the legal and ethical 
issues surrounding the technique.142 One FDA employee announced at 
the 2014 Advisory Committee meeting that the “FDA is [cognizant] that 
there are ethical, legal, and social policy issues raised by such heritable 
 
didn’t understand that it wasn’t. Then they said they had to regulate it on the basis that it was 
genetic engineering”); Human Cloning: How Close Is It?, supra note 71; see also Meeting #32 
Transcript, supra note 8, at 46 (“In March of 2001, a laboratory of Dr. Jacques Cohen reported 
that two children born after the ooplasm transfer protocol were heteroplasmic, which means 
the genotypes of both the ooplasm donor and the mother could be detected in their tissues. 
These children were approximately one year old at the time of this analysis, so this was a 
persistent heteroplasmy that had been maintained. At the time of Dr. Cohen’s publication the 
FDA was already considering action in the area of ooplasm transfer. The report of 
heteroplasmy raised . . . concerns, as did information [that] two pregnancies occurring after 
ooplasm transfer resulted in fetuses with Turner’s syndrome, a condition where there is only 
one X chromosome.”); PREVENTING MITOCHONDRIAL DISEASE, supra note 12. 
 140 See Meeting #59 Transcript, supra note 32. In the FDA-prepared briefing document, the 
Agency explained the science underlying both mitochondrial transfer and cytoplasmic transfer. 
The Agency’s briefing document also described “some of the key safety issues that have been 
identified” in the study of mitochondrial transfer. None of these identified “safety” issues 
overlapped with ethical issues. Id. Also, the term “safety” has various definitions as many of the 
agency’s regulated products, namely pharmaceuticals, result in serious side effects. See Meeting 
#32 Transcript, supra note 8, at 47 (“FDA had concerns about whether we understood all the 
ramifications of this procedure and whether we understood its safety in particular, and reacted 
by sending letters to practitioners who were identified by publications on ooplasm [cytoplasm] 
transfer or by advertisements offering the procedure. We advised practitioners that we would 
now require the submission of an investigational new drug application, or IND, to the agency 
and its subsequent review to continue to treat new patients.”). 
 141 Meeting #59 Transcript, supra note 32, at 13 (emphasis added). 
 142 See id. at 11–13, 25. 
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genetic modification of gametes, but these [a]re outside of FDA’s 
delegated authority, and will not be discussed at this meeting.”143 The 
Agency did not hold a subsequent meeting to address the remaining 
legal and ethical issues. 
Legal issues were similarly avoided during a 2002 Advisory 
Committee meeting after the issuance of Untitled Letters to researchers 
on cytoplasmic transfer.144 There, an FDA employee informed attendees 
of the meeting that it would “limit . . . discussion to the science behind 
[cytoplasmic] transfer and not extend that discussion to FDA’s 
jurisdiction in general, FDA’s proposed rules for the regulation of 
human cells and tissues and other assisted reproductive technologies.”145 
Thus, in spite of the importance of legal interpretation in the regulation 
of advanced assisted reproductive technologies, the Agency has avoided 
discussions of its jurisdiction and its position on ethical issues. 
The public statements of FDA officials, as evidenced by the 
testimony of agency officials before Congress from 1997 to 2016 and 
FDA employees’ statements in other venues between 2000 and 2016 
allude to the ethical concerns that may underlie the FDA’s regulatory 
decision-making process.146 When subterranean regulatory actions 
occur, it is possible, for example, that Agency officials are not acting 
based on the political beliefs of the President or sound legal 
interpretation, but instead institutional or individual views on ethics. 
Transparent regulation would help to prevent this by clarifying what (or 
whose) ethical perspectives are being incorporated into regulatory 
decisions and the source of those ethical perspectives. 
In spite of the unidentified basis for its assertion of jurisdiction, Dr. 
Kathryn Zoon, an FDA official, still asserted in congressional testimony 
that an investigational new drug application had to be submitted by a 
researcher before the commencement of “[c]linical research using 
cloning technology to clone a human being,” although the agency would 
 
 143 Id. at 17–18. 
 144 See Meeting #32 Transcript, supra note 8, at 47. 
 145 Id. at 48. 
 146 See Congressional Testimony 2017, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/News
Events/Testimony/ucm383860.htm (last updated June 22, 2016) (containing FDA testimony 
from 1997 to 2016); Speeches by FDA Officials, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://
www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/default.htm (last updated Oct. 18, 2016). Note, while the 
FDA posts the speeches of “agency officials” on the websites, this does not mean that the 
speeches of all agency employees are posted online. For example, the speech by FDA 
Commissioner Robert M. Califf to the 2016 Food Drug and Law Institute Annual Meeting is 
available online; however, the subsequent speech by the Agency’s Chief Counsel, Elizabeth 
Dickinson, is not maintained in the speeches repository. See Robert M. Califf, Comm’r, Speech 
at 2016 FDLI Annual Meeting (May 5, 2016), https://wayback.archive-it.org/7993/
20170111003315/http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/ucm499475.htm (“The good news 
is that after I’m done you’ll hear from FDA’s top lawyer, Liz Dickinson.”). The speeches 
archived on the FDA website span from 1988 until 2016; however, there are very few from 1988 
to 2005. 
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not permit any such clinical investigation to proceed due to “major 
unresolved safety questions . . . .”147 These unresolved safety questions 
were not identified. Yet, a statement later in Dr. Zoon’s testimony 
explained that safety issues were not the only reason for the Agency’s 
opposition to cloning: “Because of the profound moral, ethical, and 
scientific issues, the Administration is unequivocally opposed to the 
cloning of human beings.”148 Dr. Zoon’s reference to “the 
Administration” was likely her referring to the Food and Drug 
Administration; however, the Food and Drug Administration is a part 
of the executive branch and not an independent regulatory agency, so it 
is possible that political concerns affected her testimony.149 These same 
concerns have surfaced in relation to other advanced assisted 
reproductive technologies and assisted reproductive technology in 
general, which forces politicians to consider their positions on 
reproductive rights. Much has been written in the administrative 
literature about the political pressures that administrative agencies face; 
here, ethical issues such as those related to the destruction of embryos, 
eugenics, and concerns about modifications of genetic material for 
future generations, have possibly commingled with political concerns 
and pressures.150 Thus, while Chevron deference and issues of 
“reasonable” agency interpretation of a statute arise within this 
discussion of the FDA’s regulation of AARTs, it needs to be clear what 
aspect of the FDA’s decision is based on statutory interpretation (and of 
course, what statute is being interpreted), and what aspect of that 
interpretation is based on ethics—which would be entitled to less 
deference.151 
A.     Embryo Destruction and Research: Current Iterations of a 
Decades-Long Debate 
 
The destruction of embryos and controversy related to research on 
embryonic tissue are likely additional “moral, ethical, and social policy 
 
 147 Statement of Kathryn C. Zoon, supra note 72. 
 148 Id. 
 149 See FDA Laws, Regulations, and Guidance Documents, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/BiologicsBloodVaccines/InternationalActivities/
UCM273183.pdf (last visited June 13, 2016). For more on the differences between independent 
regulatory agencies and federal agencies that are a part of the Executive Branch, see Kirti Datla 
& Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 
CORNELL L. REV. 769, 776 n.24 (2013). 
 150 For a general overview of pressures faced by administrative agencies, see Seidenfeld, 
supra note 82. 
 151 For more on Chevron deference, see Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s 
Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight”, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143 (2012). 
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issues related to genetic modification of eggs and embryos . . . [with the] 
potential to affect regulatory decisions.”152 In addition to research on 
embryos, another issue that arises in discussions of the ethics of 
mitochondrial transfer is the destruction of embryos.153 The Institute of 
Medicine, in a report commissioned by the FDA, also recognized the 
“moral status of the embryo” as an ethical issue related to mitochondrial 
transfer.154 This report identified this issue, but did not analyze it nor 
explain how the FDA had incorporated that “moral issue” into its 
regulatory decision-making before.155 
Ethical concerns have impacted federal funding decisions related to 
embryonic research for years.156 However, the idea that ethical concerns 
could manifest as legal prohibitions on access to reproductive 
technology regardless of funding sources, has not received as much 
attention outside of discussions about access to abortion and 
contraception.157 
There are many ethical issues that are ripe for a public discussion. 
Questions about where one “draws the line” between ethical and 
unethical medical practices have accompanied assisted reproductive 
technology since its inception.158 Mitochondrial transfer, beyond issues 
 
 152 Meeting #59 Transcript, supra note 32, at 13; see also James Gallagher, Three-Person 
Babies - Not Three-Parent Babies, BBC (Feb. 1, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/health-
31044255; MITOCHONDRIAL REPLACEMENT TECHNIQUES, supra note 29, at 7–9. 
 153 See Gallagher, supra note 152; MITOCHONDRIAL REPLACEMENT TECHNIQUES, supra note 
29, at 5–11. 
 154 MITOCHONDRIAL REPLACEMENT TECHNIQUES, supra note 29, at 102–06. The Institute of 
Medicine recommended that non-viable human embryos be used “when possible” in preclinical 
research related to mitochondrial transfer. Id. at 12. 
 155 Id. at 1–2. After the 2014 Advisory Committee meetings on February 25-26, 2014, the 
FDA’s Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, Office of Cellular, Tissue, and Gene 
Therapies requested that a committee of the Institute of Medicine “develop a report that 
[would] inform the [FDA] in consideration of review of applications in the area of genetic 
modification of eggs and zygotes for the prevention of mitochondrial disease specific to 
mitochondrial DNA . . . including maternal spindle transfer, pronuclear transfer, . . . polar body 
transfer . . . and [possibly] other technologies not currently proposed.” Id. at 2. 
 156 See Carbone, supra note 91, at 348 (“The ban on use of federal funds for embryo 
experimentation makes it difficult to undertake the expensive testing that might persuade the 
FDA to authorize use of the technique; that testing today is taking place in Britain, not the U.S.” 
(citations omitted)). For more on funding policies affecting embryo research, see O. Carter 
Snead, Science, Public Bioethics, and the Problem of Integration, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1529, 
1552–53 (2010). 
 157 See HUTT ET AL., supra note 110, at 18 (“Recently, however, both the George W. Bush 
Administration and the Obama administration have generated controversy by interfering in the 
FDA decision making process regarding petitions to institute and expand over-the-counter 
availability of Plan B emergency contraceptives.”). “No Rx/OTC switch in history has attracted 
more attention than the switch of the emergency contraceptive, Plan B, from prescription to 
nonprescription status.” Id. at 966. 
 158 See CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 115, at 5 (“Artificial insemination by donor, for 
example, was considered a form of adultery when first introduced in the 1940s. . . . When 
prenatal diagnosis was introduced in the late 1960s, the public simultaneously welcomed the 
opportunity to prevent lethal disease in newborns but worried about the use of such techniques 
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of embryo storage and disposition, inevitably involves the destruction of 
reproductive tissue.159 Yet, part of the difference between these long-
standing issues resultant from the use of conventional assisted 
reproductive technology and the ethical issues resultant from the use of 
advanced assisted reproductive technologies is that the implicit 
resolution of the ethical issues related to the use of AARTs differs from 
the regulatory treatment of the ethical issues presented by the use of 
conventional assisted reproductive technology: by not asserting any 
interest in regulating conventional forms of assisted reproduction or 
diagnostic techniques such as pre-implantation genetic diagnosis or in 
vitro fertilization, which are other techniques that can also contribute to 
the destruction of embryos, the FDA essentially left these ethical 
questions to individual states. Now, by comparison, however, the FDA 
is at least partially making a decision on ethics as it relates to advanced 
assisted reproductive technologies and targeting them for oversight, 
which is a change from the Agency’s previous regulatory position. 
B.     Germline Modification: Changing the “Shared” Human 
Identity 
 
Germline modification is an ethical issue not only for advanced 
assisted reproductive technologies, but also for genome editing through 
CRISPR-Cas9 and other technologies that permit genome editing.160 
Part of the discussion of this ethical issue centers on what even 
constitutes the “germline” or a “germline modification.”161 There is no 
uniform definition of the human germline.162 “In place of [the term] 
germline, some prefer the term ‘inheritable genetic modification.’”163 
Nonetheless, some of the ethical objection to modifying the germline 
comes from arguments related to kinship and the belief that a shared 
human germline unites humankind.164 
 
to select ‘vanity’ characteristics or nonmedical traits in offspring. The birth of Louise Brown, 
conceived via in vitro fertilization, in 1978 was another dramatic event, providing a new and 
controversial means to parenthood.”). 
 159 See Ian Sample, “Three-Parent” Babies Explained: What Are the Concerns and Are They 
Justified?, GUARDIAN (Feb. 2, 2015, 10:56 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/feb/
02/three-parent-babies-explained; see also Paula Amato et al., Three-Parent In Vitro 
Fertilization: Gene Replacement for the Prevention of Inherited Mitochondrial Diseases, 101 
FERTILITY & STERILITY 31 (2014). 
 160 See Callaway, supra note 23; see also Regalado, supra note 23. 
 161 See FRANKEL & HAGEN, supra note 31, at 4–6; discussion supra Part I. 
 162 See FRANKEL & HAGEN, supra note 31, at 1. 
 163 Id. at 5. 
 164 See MITOCHONDRIAL REPLACEMENT TECHNIQUES, supra note 29, at xiv (The Institute of 
Medicine noted that mitochondrial DNA “plays a central role in genetic ancestry, [although] 
traits that are carried in [nuclear ] DNA are those that in the public understanding constitute 
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To the Institute of Medicine, which issued an FDA-commissioned 
report on mitochondrial transfer in 2016, there is a “clear line” in 
American policy addressing genetic modifications of humans and that 
clear line is between modifications that are heritable, such as those 
involving germline modification, and those that are not heritable.165 In 
2015, a posting on the White House blog by the White House Director 
of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, entitled A Note on 
Genome Editing, stated “[t]he Administration believes that altering the 
human germline for clinical purposes is a line that should not be crossed 
at this time.”166 However, some legal analyses differentiate between 
germline modifications to create “designer babies” and modifications to 
cure medical defects.167 Other ethicists group all germline modifications 
together due to a fear that once one germline modification occurs, in 
order to treat disease, scientists will undertake subsequent modifications 
for nontherapeutic reasons.168 
A more detailed inquiry may reveal that there is a difference to the 
American public between using assisted reproductive technology to 
have a child with blue eyes instead of brown eyes, for instance, and 
using assisted reproductive technology to prevent the passage of 
muscular dystrophy to future generations.169 Currently, it is unclear 
 
the core of genetic relatedness . . . .”); see also WATTS ET AL., supra note 28, at 53, 83–84. 
 165 See MITOCHONDRIAL REPLACEMENT TECHNIQUES, supra note 29, at 88. 
 166 John P. Holdren, A Note on Genome Editing, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (May 26, 2015, 10:40 
AM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/05/26/note-genome-editing; see also 
FRANKEL & HAGEN, supra note 31, at 1 (Although there is no uniform definition of the germ 
line, Frankel and Hagen explain that “[t]he term ‘germline’ refers to genetic material that is 
hereditable from parent to child.”). 
 167 See Robertson, supra note 16, at 216 (“The prospect of oocyte cytoplasm transfers thus 
requires rethinking the per se ban on germ-line alterations. The question posed is whether 
germ-line alterations are always unacceptable. Oocyte transfers suggest that this is not always 
the case. Such transfers appear to serve important family and procreative interests, and present 
little harm to offspring or others, once the safety and efficacy of the procedure is established. 
The fact that the needed therapeutic intervention affects mtDNA in the germ-line has no 
independent ethical significance (beyond the concerns that arise with egg donation). It will 
prevent mitochondrial disease in offspring, and female offspring will avoid the need to undergo 
similar procedures if they reproduce. Indeed, a blanket ban on germ-line effects strictly applied 
would condemn somatic cell therapies and many other disease treatments. Many of them affect 
the germ-line, albeit indirectly, by enabling persons who would not have survived or been able 
to reproduce to do so, thus assuring that genes of that particular germ-line will be passed on.”). 
 168 See id. at 216–17; see also David Cyranoski, Scientists Sound Alarm over DNA Editing of 
Human Embryos, NATURE (Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.nature.com/news/scientists-sound-
alarm-over-dna-editing-of-human-embryos-1.17110 (“Such research could be exploited for 
non-therapeutic modifications. . . . Many groups, including Urnov’s company, are already 
using gene-editing tools to develop therapies that correct genetic defects in people (such as by 
editing white blood cells). They fear that attempts to produce ‘designer babies’ by applying the 
methods to embryos will create a backlash against all use of the technology. . . . But other 
scientists disagree with that stance. Although there needs to be a wide discussion of the safety 
and ethics of editing embryos and reproductive cells, they say, the potential to eliminate 
inherited diseases means that scientists should pursue research.”). 
 169 While designer babies based on appearance are not a possibility with mitochondrial 
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whether the FDA has considered this viewpoint when analyzing the 
regulatory treatment of technologies that result in germline 
modifications or advanced assisted reproductive technologies. There is 
no way to know how clear the line between different types of 
modifications actually is without an accurate explanation of the science, 
public input, and transparent regulation. 
In addition to defining the germline, related questions about 
inheritable modifications will surface in discussions of all medical 
techniques that modify the germline such as: “Why should it be ethical 
to pass on faulty DNA, but unethical to impart healthy DNA?”170 If at 
some point we have the ability to prevent future generations from 
inheriting diseases, why shouldn’t we do so? Would individuals who 
have defective mitochondria or genes feel a pressure to use scientific 
techniques to prevent the transmission of those genes to future 
children? What are the implications, from a disability perspective, of 
stating that certain traits are undesirable in future generations?171 An 
open public discussion would allow for an informed discussion of our 
present scientific capabilities, imminent and likely future capabilities, 
and whether there is indeed a line that should not be crossed. 
 
C.     Organ Transplantation as Opposed to Genetic Modification: 
An Alternative Perspective on Replacing Defective Cell Components 
 
It is possible that using mitochondrial transfer is more like an 
organ transplant than a genetic modification or a drug. For example, 
mitochondria have also been analogized to the “batteries in a cell,” a 
metaphor that resurfaces in discussions of the scientific and ethical 
issues related to mitochondrial transfer.172 Many view mitochondrial 
transfer as similar to “changing the batteries in a laptop . . . .”173 
Similarly, the U.K.’s Chief Medical Officer has compared mitochondrial 
 
transfer, it is not a foregone conclusion that one day, mitochondria cannot be engineered to be 
“better” such that these energy processing aspects of the cell could be improved. See FRANKEL & 
HAGEN, supra note 31, at 7 (“‘[g]ood mitochondrial DNA could facilitate athleticism, and 
reduce risk for obesity or diabetes,’ . . . [therefore,] refinement of mitochondrial donation 
presents the possibility of a slippery slope from treatment of [mitochondrial ]DNA disease to 
enhancement of normal energy production capabilities.” (quoting Rob Waters, Gene Mix in 
Monkeys Fixes Defect, Opens New Ethics Debate, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 26, 2009), http://
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?ppid=2107001&sid=aMTU6ucOhbnw))). 
 170 Malik, supra note 39. 
 171 See Elizabeth F. Emens, Framing Disability, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1383 (2012). 
 172 See OFFICE FOR PUB. MGMT., MEDICAL FRONTIERS: DEBATING MITOCHONDRIA 
REPLACEMENT: ANNEX 1: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE 9 (2013) (reporting members of the public 
referring to mitochondria as laptop batteries); WATTS ET AL., supra note 28, at 18. 
 173 WATTS ET AL., supra note 28, at 78. 
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transfer to “changing a car battery . . . .”174 Thus, in the United Kingdom 
where the government executed a five-strand “project” of public 
engagement in spite of media coverage sensationalizing mitochondrial 
transfer as “three-parent in vitro fertilization,” many members of the 
U.K.’s public indicated that they viewed mitochondrial transfer as more 
similar to conventional organ or tissue donation (e.g., blood donation, 
liver transplant, etc.), than to a eugenics practice.175 
A New York Times article provides a similar American perspective: 
“The best analogy for mitochondrial transfer is that of an organ 
transplant.”176 Doctors and scientists “play God . . . every 
day . . . [w]hether transplanting naturally faulty hearts, or delivering a 
baby by cesarean section when natural birth may be impossible or 
dangerous, the very essence of medicine is to right the wrongs of 
nature.”177 If the analogy to organ transplant were indeed apt, then 
perhaps the technique should be regulated as an organ transplant which 
would move it out of the jurisdiction of the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (assuming this agency was the proper regulator in the 
first place), and into the jurisdiction of another agency within the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services: the Health Resources and 
Services Administration.178 To have information on how many 
American scientists and members of the public share this view would be 
helpful to policymakers, lawmakers, and regulated entities. 
IV.     A RANGE OF REGULATORY OPTIONS 
 
There are a number of ways to regulate advanced assisted 
reproductive technologies, and ultimately this Article argues that 
advanced assisted reproductive technologies should be subject to the 
same minimal regulation as other forms of assisted reproductive 
technology. The range of regulatory options includes: (1) maintaining 
 
 174 Sarah Knapton, Three Parent Babies: Britain Has Breached EU Law, MEPs Warn, 
TELEGRAPH (Feb. 21, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/11425602/Three-
parent-babies-Britain-has-breached-EU-law-MEPs-warn.html. 
 175 See WATTS ET AL., supra note 28, at 72, 78; discussion infra Part IV; see also Hannah 
Darby, Mitochondrial Replacement Consultation: Advice to Government 24 (Human 
Fertilisation & Embryology Authority, Paper No. HFEA (20/03/13) 665, 2013) (providing the 
recommendation of the U.K.’s HFEA that “mitochondria donors should have a similar status to 
that of tissue donors,” which means that “[c]hildren born of mitochondria replacement should 
not have a right to access identifying information about the donor when they reach the age of 
18”). 
 176 Malik, supra note 39. 
 177 Id. 
 178 About Us, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://www.organdonor.gov/about-dot.html (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2018). For statutory provisions governing organ transplantation, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 273–
74g (2012). 
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the status quo, which means the continuance of subterranean 
regulation; (2) modifying the status quo so as to ameliorate one or more 
of the features that render the FDA’s regulation of advanced assisted 
reproductive technology subterranean; and (3) returning the state of 
regulation to that which existed before July 6, 2001. This Article 
advocates for option three, returning the state of regulation to that 
which existed before the FDA issued its letters on July 6, 2001. Option 
three would be a state-based approach to the regulation of advanced 
assisted reproductive technologies without the additional federal 
regulation that has been unique to advanced assisted reproductive 
technologies. 
Under option one, maintaining the status quo, the FDA would 
continue to regulate advanced assisted reproductive technologies in a 
subterranean manner and nothing would change. Under this approach, 
advanced assisted reproductive technologies (and cloning) would 
continue to be illegal in the United States as a result of subterranean 
regulation. New technologies would continue to be hindered by such a 
regime. For example, in 2013 the FDA sent a letter to OvaScience, a 
Massachusetts-based company, stating that the company needed to 
submit an investigational new drug application in order to continue its 
work on “Augment,” a technology that uses a woman’s own 
mitochondria to revitalize her eggs which are then used in in vitro 
fertilization.179 This FDA letter, obtained through FOIA Request 2016-
4882 stated, on the subject of “more than minimal manipulation”: 
Our understanding is that your autologous mitochondrial transfer 
product, AUGMENT, consists of cells isolated from a biopsy of 
ovarian tissue, which are processed to extract mitochondria that are 
then introduced into other reproductive tissues during the IVF 
process. The removal of mitochondria and introduction into other 
reproductive tissue appears to be more than minimal manipulation. 
This is based on the limited information available; please note that 
the addition of mitochondrial DNA to other reproductive tissue may 
raise additional regulatory concerns.180 
I learned of this letter based on media accounts and court 
documents related to a shareholder lawsuit which cited to the FDA’s 
letter. I was only able to confirm the content of this letter through a 
FOIA request that resulted in the transmission of a copy of the letter 
along with accompanying additional documents.181 In one of those 
accompanying documents, representatives of the company inquired as 
 
 179 See Letter from Celia M. Witten to Alison Lawton, supra note 7; see also Press Release, 
OvaScience, First Baby Born with OvaScience’s AUGMENT Fertility Treatment (May 7, 2015), 
http://ir.ovascience.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=251343&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=2045382. 
 180 Letter from Celia M. Witten to Alison Lawton, supra note 7. 
 181 See id. 
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to whether the letter would be 
made publicly available and whether FDA intends to issue other 
letters. Dr. Witten stated that there are no plans to post the 
September 6, 2013 letter; however, she noted that should FDA receive 
a FOIA request, FDA would be required to comply with the 
disclosure rules and she does not know what the outcome of such a 
request would be. In response to the latter question, Dr. Witten 
stated that she cannot comment on what might happen in the 
future.182 
Thus, as recently as 2013, the FDA was continuing to regulate 
nonconventional forms of assisted reproductive technology in a 
subterranean manner.183 If the FDA continues to regulate advanced 
assisted reproductive technologies in this manner, then other scientists 
may be prevented from providing access to various assisted 
reproductive technology techniques in the United States. Furthermore, 
if the FDA’s regulation is driven by opposition to genetic modification, 
then other developing technologies that use genetic modification as a 
method of medical treatment, such as CRISPR-Cas9 or germline editing, 
may also be hindered by subterranean regulation. 
Option two, would involve the FDA continuing to regulate 
advanced assisted reproductive technologies but with increased 
transparency and clarity. In other words, the Agency would regulate in a 
less subterranean fashion. After years of regulating via letter without a 
legal challenge, the Agency might continue regulating advanced assisted 
reproductive technologies in a subterranean manner unless stakeholders 
successfully petition Congress for clearer legislation; Congress mandates 
that the Agency stop regulating AARTs; or researchers ignore the FDA’s 
letters and successfully litigate against the Agency in an enforcement 
action.184 Thus, the FDA could wait for mandatory external direction 
 
 182 Id.; Telephone Conference with Rachael Anatol & Celia Witten, U.S. Food & Drug 
Admin., and Michelle Dipp & Allison Lawton, OvaScience Inc., supra note 17. 
 183 Id.; see Letter from Mary A. Malarkey to John Zhang, supra note 138. The most recent 
2017 letter to a provider of three-parent in vitro fertilization was cited to in the Washington 
Post and by numerous news outlets. See Cha, supra note 7. 
 184 See Wu, supra note 19, at 1850 (noting that “by the 1990s, the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission had begun to think that oversight of certain derivatives products might be 
necessary[, b]ut Congress barred regulation based on industry arguments that, among other 
reasons, the rapidly changing nature of the industry made regulation ill-advised” (citing Gary 
Gensler, History of Derivatives Regulation, Culprit OTCs, COMMODITYONLINE (2010))). “But it 
is also critical to remember that… [i]n most circumstances a party unhappy . . . can challenge 
the [agency] threat by ignoring it . . . . Id. at 1853; see also K.M. Lewis, Informal Guidance and 
the FDA, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 507, 542 (2011) (“Likewise, unlike regulations promulgated 
through notice-and-comment rulemaking, obtaining judicial review of guidance documents is 
quite difficult due to the finality and ripeness doctrines.”). Another solution, which would 
apply not only to the FDA but administrative agencies in general, would be “immediate review 
of nonlegislative rules under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) . . . .” Mark Seidenfeld, 
Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance Documents, 90 TEX. L. REV. 331, 333 
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from Congress or the judiciary that would result in the Agency 
regulating more transparently and with a clearer legal foundation, or the 
FDA could develop and implement its own transparent best practices 
sua sponte or in response to a citizen petition.185 Thus, one way to 
improve transparency and clarity would be for the FDA to clearly 
explain the regulatory foundation of the letters sent to AART-providers. 
The National Academy of Science’s Institute of Medicine noted 
that foreign data could aid the FDA’s assessment of the advantages and 
disadvantages of mitochondrial replacement therapy.186 The FDA 
should not only examine the scientific data provided by foreign sources, 
such as scientists in the United Kingdom, but it should also consider the 
United Kingdom’s process for approving mitochondrial transfer which 
included parliamentary briefings and clear explanations of the science 
underlying the technology as a part of the country’s extensive public 
consultation.187 In the United Kingdom, where human trials related to 
mitochondrial transfer have begun, public consultations revealed that 
“[t]hose in favour of the [mitochondrial transfer] techniques felt either 
that the only implication of changing the germ line is the removal of 
terrible disease from a family, that the germ line would be changed for 
the better, or that any negative implications would be outweighed by the 
positive ones.”188 While it is helpful to have the views of another 
advanced Western nation’s view on the subject, it is critical that there be 
a method to obtain the views of the American public on the many issues 
that arise as a result of advanced assisted reproductive technologies and 
scientific innovations that may affect the human germline such as 
CRISPR-Cas9, especially if perspectives on these ethical issues will 
continue to impact federal regulatory decisions. 
The FDA, while referred to as an “agency” is, like all organizations, 
composed of individuals. If the FDA continues to incorporate ethical 
views into regulatory decisions, then it should at least be aware of a 
broad spectrum of ethical views and not just the views of its employees. 
In the United Kingdom, the agency that wrote the draft regulations on 
mitochondrial transfer that were approved by Parliament recommended 
 
(2011). 
 185 See Warning and Untitled Letters, supra note 4 (“As a result of the Agency’s 
Transparency Initiative, the Centers are working to disclose more Untitled Letters on FDA’s 
website. The Agency believes that posting additional Untitled Letters may increase public 
accountability of firms, which may deter future violations and increase compliance with the 
law. However, due to limited resources, the Agency is not able to post all Untitled Letters at this 
time.”). For more on citizens’ petitions, see 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (2017). See generally Michael A. 
Carrier & Daryl Wander, Citizen Petitions: An Empirical Study, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 249 
(2012). 
 186 See MITOCHONDRIAL REPLACEMENT TECHNIQUES, supra note 29, at 4–12, 15. 
 187 See Darby, supra note 175; see also PREVENTING MITOCHONDRIAL DISEASE, supra note 
12. 
 188 Darby, supra note 175, at 16. 
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and executed a five-strand “project” of public engagement which 
included deliberative public workshops, a public representative survey, 
an open consultation questionnaire, open consultation meetings, and a 
patient focus group.189 Following the lead of the United Kingdom, 
which approved the clinical use of mitochondrial transfer after public 
discussion, the FDA should solicit public input on the ethical issues 
resultant from mitochondrial transfer and other advanced assisted 
reproductive technologies. The FDA should also aim to not only gain 
insights from the public about advanced assisted reproductive 
technologies, but also to clearly inform the public of the scientific, legal, 
and ethical issues that accompany the clinical use of advanced assisted 
reproductive technologies. The example of the United Kingdom also 
raises the possibility that a more appropriate governmental structure 
could be to have one designated federal agency that addresses all issues 
related to human reproduction. However, politics in the United 
Kingdom and the United States vary significantly, and such an agency 
that concentrates on health-related decision-making would likely be 
unwanted in the United States which also does not have a National 
Health Service like the United Kingdom does.190 
The National Academy of Science’s Institute of Medicine solicited 
public comments on ethical issues related to mitochondrial transfer to 
aid in the preparation of its 2016 report.191 These comments addressed 
issues such as “the ethics of heritable genetic modification . . . , patient 
perspectives, the role of religion, and how to conduct an ethically 
acceptable investigation of [mitochondrial transfer].”192 “Notice and 
comment” is a well-known and crucial part of federal agency 
rulemaking.193 While the FDA did solicit comments on its human tissue 
regulations, after years of not regulating reproductive medicine, it could 
have been unclear to many observers that these regulations would apply 
to human reproductive tissue. Similarly, at the time that the human 
tissue regulations were promulgated, mitochondrial transfer had not 
received the news coverage that it has today. In other words, there was 
no mitochondrial transfer technology available to save human lives in 
2001. 
At a minimum, if the FDA is going to continue regulating 
advanced assisted reproductive technologies based not only on science 
but also certain ethical views, then it should use the Federal Register and 
media contacts to clearly solicit public comments with a specific focus 
 
 189  See PREVENTING MITOCHONDRIAL DISEASE, supra note 12; Darby, supra note 175. 
 190 See About the National Health Service (NHS), NHS, http://www.nhs.uk/NHSEngland/
thenhs/about/Pages/overview.aspx (last updated Apr. 13, 2016). 
 191 MITOCHONDRIAL REPLACEMENT TECHNIQUES, supra note 29, at 1–3. 
 192 Id. at 3. 
 193 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
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on the ethical issues related to the use of advanced assisted reproductive 
technologies. Public comment often involves the use of an online 
website, such as regulations.gov, so that members of the public can 
provide their comments to the agency in addition to public meetings. If 
the FDA continues to regulate AARTs, then unlike the promulgation of 
its human tissue regulations where the FDA had one public meeting 
related to human bone grafts, the FDA should schedule many public 
meetings related to the regulation of AARTs where FDA employees and 
technical experts would not only solicit public comments but also 
clearly explain the science underlying advanced assisted reproductive 
technologies. The FDA should not only hold these meetings in person, 
but it should also use web-based technology to allow more members of 
the public to not only gain more information about advanced assisted 
reproductive technologies, but also to provide their comments.194 
Furthermore, those public comments should focus on the 
appropriateness of continuing to regulate AARTs based on the concept 
of “minimal manipulation” or “more than minimal manipulation.” 
Once an application has been submitted to the FDA, it is too late to 
discuss ethical issues due not only to the Agency’s decision-making 
process, but also to the way the Agency has structured its regulations on 
data and application confidentiality.195 The FDA’s regulations are so 
restrictive that the Agency will not confirm or deny whether an entity 
has submitted an investigational new drug application (unless that 
company has publicly acknowledged its application).196 Thus, there is no 
public announcement that the FDA is even considering an application 
that could be impacted by ethical concerns or a bias against genetic 
modifications. Similarly, as noted above in the Introduction, the FDA 
does not maintain a complete publicly available database of the Untitled 
Letters and their addressees. 
It is not impossible for the FDA to regulate clearly and 
transparently. Other agencies that contend with not only proprietary 
information, but also national security concerns, are able to conduct 
public meetings around the country where members of the public 
 
 194 See OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, A GUIDE TO THE RULEMAKING PROCESS, https://
www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf (“During the comment 
period, an agency may also hold public hearings where people can make statements and submit 
data. Some agencies operate under laws that require rulemaking hearings. Others may hold 
public meetings to collect more information or to help affected groups get a better 
understanding of the proposed rule. Many agencies are beginning to use webcasts and 
interactive Internet sessions to broaden the audience attending public meetings.”). 
 195 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 601.50–.51 (2018). 
 196 Id.; see also 21 C.F.R. § 312.50 (2016) (explaining that a “sponsor” has a specific meaning 
to the Agency that signifies that an individual or entity has a pending investigational new drug 
application before the FDA). Due to the operation of the Agency’s confidentiality regulations 
and record-keeping practices, it is not possible for the public to obtain an accurate count of 
how many letters like the July 6, 2001 letter have been issued. 
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express their views on licensing actions and maintain comprehensive 
databases of the agency’s public documents. For example, the U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has managed to provide online 
public access to the “730,000 full-text documents that the NRC has 
released since November 1, 1999, and several hundred new documents 
are added each day.”197 These available documents include documents 
that are not part of licensing dockets and public documents that are part 
of licensing dockets (even those license applications that are pending). 
The U.S. NRC’s recordkeeping process enables it to provide public 
access to any array of documents in addition to screening those dockets 
for national security information and proprietary information.198 The 
FDA’s system for responding to FOIA requests reveals that the FDA is 
similarly capable of redacting proprietary information before providing 
it to the public. 
Option three, which I ultimately argue for, is one in which the FDA 
does not regulate advanced assisted reproductive technologies at all. 
Instead, individual states, if they wish, should enact legislation related to 
the legality of AARTs, as states already do with other issues related to 
scientific research and family law such as cloning and the legality of 
surrogacy contracts.199 States may face the same difficulty in examining 
ethical issues or be similarly constrained by political concerns or 
misinformation as the federal government; however, the benefit of a 
state-based approach is that there are multiple opportunities (e.g., fifty) 
to examine the ethical and scientific concerns underlying advanced 
assisted reproductive technologies, even though such an approach may 
lead to a domestic form of “reproductive tourism” or forum shopping.200 
Another possible modus operandi for the third option would be 
that doctors simply regulate themselves; in spite of this possibility, and 
 
 197 ADAMS Public Documents, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/adams.html (last updated Aug. 9, 2017). The FDA has an “Electronic Reading Room”; 
however, that reading room is a website, which provides links to the various centers of the 
FDA, which is not easily searchable. See Electronic Reading Room, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/foi/ElectronicReadingRoom/default.htm (last 
updated Mar. 6, 2017). The Electronic Reading Room is also a part of the Agency’s FOIA 
requirements and not an attempt to provide public access to all publicly accessible documents. 
See Freedom of Information, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
RegulatoryInformation/FOI (last updated Sept. 27, 2016) (“The 1996 amendments to the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) mandate publicly accessible ‘electronic reading rooms’ 
with agency FOIA response materials and other information routinely available to the public, 
with electronic search and indexing features.”). 
 198 See Information Security, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/security/
info-security.html (last updated Aug. 11, 2017). 
 199 See Gaia Bernstein, Unintended Consequences: Prohibitions on Gamete Donor Anonymity 
and the Fragile Practice of Surrogacy, 10 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 291, 296 (2013); Symposium, 
Cloning Californians? Report of the California Advisory Committee on Human Cloning, 53 
HASTINGS L.J. 1143 (2002). 
 200 For more on reproductive tourism or the broader concept of “medical tourism,” see I. 
Glenn Cohen, Circumvention Tourism, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1309 (2012). 
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in light of past well-known instances of physicians and researchers 
failing to adhere to ethical guidelines for human subjects research or 
general medical norms, I still advocate for some state oversight, however 
minimal.201 It is possible that this framework already exists through state 
statutes addressing research and informed consent; thus, the state-based 
regulation of AARTs does not necessarily require the enactment of 
additional regulations specific to AARTs. While there are some 
disadvantages to a state-based regulatory approach, those disadvantages 
do not outweigh the advantages of a state-based approach, which would 
still provide for informed consent and other patient protections.202 
There are several reasons why the FDA should not regulate 
AARTs. First, it is likely that the FDA does not have jurisdiction over 
advanced assisted reproductive technologies at all. This characterization 
stems not only from confusion over whether federal statutory provisions 
apply to advanced assisted reproductive technologies, but also from the 
fact that advanced assisted reproductive technologies do not fall within 
the usual categories regulated by the FDA: food, drugs, medical devices, 
and biologics.203 Second, even if the Agency does have jurisdiction over 
advanced assisted reproductive technologies, the process of asserting 
jurisdiction has been marked by uncertainty, opacity, and 
counterintuitive regulations.204 Thus, even if the FDA has jurisdiction 
over AARTs, the Agency’s current regulatory approach of treating 
AARTs like drugs or biologics does not adequately consider their 
accompanying legal and ethical issues and the impact of the FDA’s 
 
 201 See, e.g., The Tuskegee Timeline, CENTERS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/timeline.htm (last updated Aug. 30, 2017) (“In July 1972, an 
Associated Press story about the Tuskegee Study caused a public outcry that led the Assistant 
Secretary for Health and Scientific Affairs to appoint an Ad Hoc Advisory Panel to review the 
study. The panel had nine members from the fields of medicine, law, religion, labor, education, 
health administration, and public affairs. The panel found that the men had agreed freely to be 
examined and treated. However, there was no evidence that researchers had informed them of 
the study or its real purpose. In fact, the men had been misled and had not been given all the 
facts required to provide informed consent. The men were never given adequate treatment for 
their disease. Even when penicillin became the drug of choice for syphilis in 1947, researchers 
did not offer it to the subjects. The advisory panel found nothing to show that subjects were 
ever given the choice of quitting the study, even when this new, highly effective treatment 
became widely used.”); see also Dale Keiger, Immortal Cells, Enduring Issues, JOHNS HOPKINS 
MAGAZINE (June 2, 2010), http://archive.magazine.jhu.edu/2010/06/immortal-cells-enduring-
issues (reviewing Rebecca Skloot’s The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks: “Text on the front 
cover of Skloot’s book reads, ‘Doctors took her cells without asking.’ The inside flap continues, 
‘Henrietta’s family did not learn of her “immortality” until more than 20 years after her death, 
when scientists investigating HeLa began using her husband and children in research without 
informed consent. And though the cells had launched a multimillion-dollar industry that sells 
human biological materials, her family never saw any of the profits.’ A significant segment of 
the public harbors a deeply rooted mistrust of medical research.”). 
 202 See Jessica De Bord, Informed Consent, UNIV. WASH. SCH. MED., https://
ashin.washington.edu/bioethx/topics/consent.html (last updated Mar. 7, 2014). 
 203 See What Does FDA Regulate?, supra note 22. 
 204 See supra Part II; infra Appendix A. 
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extant regulatory structure on scientific innovation, reproductive rights, 
and medical ethics. Under the current regulatory structure, the FDA is 
able to inject ethical concerns into a regulatory procedure that should 
focus on safety and efficacy and not the ethical views of a select number 
of federal employees. 
By not subjecting advanced assisted reproductive technologies to 
additional regulations, advanced assisted reproductive technologies 
would be subject to the same regulatory regime that they were subject to 
before July 6, 2001 (the date on which the FDA sent letters to physicians 
providing cytoplasmic transfer to patients in the United States). Under 
this regime, advanced assisted reproductive technologies would be 
regulated in the same manner as conventional assisted reproductive 
technologies. Thus, advanced assisted reproductive technologies would 
be subject to the standard ethical norms of medical practice and 
scientific research, including informed consent. The statements of 
physicians at the FDA’s 2002 Advisory Committee meeting indicates 
that physicians had already incorporated these concerns into the 
consent forms provided to patients who were undergoing cytoplasmic 
transfer. In sum, I argue for a regulatory regime in which advanced 
assisted reproductive technologies are not subject to subterranean 
regulation or any other sort of unique federal regulation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The field of assisted reproductive technology has generated 
controversy since its inception.205 When in vitro fertilization was first 
introduced, there was much opposition to the technique.206 
Nevertheless, today it is generally accepted ethically and legally in the 
United States, United Kingdom, and many other countries.207 
Mitochondrial transfer faces the same public hurdles as in vitro 
fertilization did in the 1970s and 1980s, in addition to additional ethical 
 
 205 See CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 115, at 5 (“Artificial insemination by donor, for 
example, was considered a form of adultery when first introduced in the 1940s. . . . When 
prenatal diagnosis was introduced in the late 1960s, the public simultaneously welcomed the 
opportunity to prevent lethal disease in newborns but worried about the use of such techniques 
to select ‘vanity’ characteristics or nonmedical traits in offspring. The birth of Louise Brown, 
conceived via in vitro fertilization, in 1978 was another dramatic event, providing a new and 
controversial means to parenthood.”). 
 206 See Connor, supra note 12. 
 207 See Press Release, Nobel Assembly at Karolinska Institutet, The Nobel Prize in 
Physiology or Medicine 2010 to Robert G. Edwards for the Development of In Vitro 
Fertilization (Oct. 4, 2010), https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/2010/
press.html. 
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hurdles related to eugenics, cloning, and germline modification.208 
CRISPR-Cas9 and other methods of gene editing will also face these 
public hurdles in addition to the barriers presented by subterranean 
regulation. 
The FDA has been regulating cloning and advanced assisted 
reproductive technologies through letters for over twenty years, 
although it has never provided proof of jurisdiction. To regulate in a 
subterranean fashion can deter research and American patients’ access 
to life-saving techniques. Because the FDA’s interpretation of what it 
can regulate is contrary to researchers’ and attorneys’ understanding of 
what the FDA regulates, these letters surprise researchers by essentially 
asserting that their AART research protocols, which would generally not 
be regulated by the FDA, are essentially the same as drugs. The letters 
sent by the FDA to researchers do not threaten enforcement action but 
act as a de facto barrier to research and the clinical use of AARTs, as 
these letters represent an agency statement that an individual or entity is 
violating federal law. 
In addition to regulating through letters, the FDA has structured its 
confidentiality regulations and recordkeeping system in a way that 
prevents the public from easily finding the letters that it issues to AART 
providers. Additionally, the Agency has promulgated regulations that 
make it such that if the Agency is not currently considering an 
application for premarket approval, then there is no docket available to 
the public and certainly no public access to a docket when there is an 
application pending. However, if the Agency is regulating through 
subterranean actions that have the effect of regulation, then the public 
needs to at least be aware of those Agency actions, and the evidence of 
those actions should be easily searchable. Furthermore, whether the 
FDA believes that advanced assisted reproductive technologies are 
analogous to biologics or drugs (or actually are biologics or drugs), it 
should be clear to the public how the FDA categorizes these 
technologies and why.209 
 
 208 See Bazian, Thousands of UK Women Could Benefit from “Three-Person” IVF, NHS 
CHOICES (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.nhs.uk/news/2015/01January/Pages/Thousands-of-UK-
women-could-benefit-from-three-person-IVF.aspx; Interview: Dr. Jamie Grifo, PBS , http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/fertility/interviews/grifo.html (last visited Mar. 4, 
2018); Connor, supra note 12; see also Bazian, Draft Regulations on “Three-Parent” IVF 
Published, NHS CHOICES (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.nhs.uk/news/2014/02February/Pages/
Draft-regulations-on-three-parent-IVF-published.aspx (“Opponents of these types of 
treatments [such as mitochondrial transfer and the use of assisted reproductive technology] cite 
what can be broadly summarised as the ‘slippery slope’ argument; this suggests that once a 
precedent has been set for altering the genetic material of an embryo prior to implantation in 
the womb, it is impossible to predict how these types of techniques might be used in the future. 
Similar concerns were raised, however, when IVF treatments were first used during the 1970s; 
today, IVF is generally accepted.”); Press Release, Nobel Assembly at Karolinska Institutet, 
supra note 207. 
 209 Both Investigational New Drug Applications and Biologics License Applications involve 
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The current regulatory environment also deprives the public of a 
clear understanding of how the multitude of ethical and legal issues 
resultant from the clinical use of advanced assisted reproductive 
technologies are incorporated into legal regulation. The increase in the 
number of regulations applicable to human reproductive tissue has not 
corresponded with a clearly articulated understanding of how the FDA 
has jurisdiction over advanced assisted reproductive technologies. 
Currently, there is no baseline in the United States for understanding 
what the general consensus might be on the ethical issues related to 
these techniques, as an informed and national discussion of these ethical 
issues has not occurred. Instead, individual ethical issues, such as 
embryo destruction, continue to arise in the context of regulatory 
decisions; however, the issues are never comprehensively addressed, nor 
is their impact on regulatory decision-making clearly identifiable. 
Furthermore, to include reproductive tissues in regulations affecting all 
human tissue inadequately considers the unique nature of human 
reproductive tissue. The regulation of human reproductive tissue and 
reproduction in general gives rise to a number of concerns including 
legal concerns related to reproductive rights. Thus, not only is clear 
decision-making a best practice for federal agencies, but it is crucial 
when federal agency decisions may somehow impact reproductive 
rights. 
 
APPENDIX A: LETTER TO SPONSORS / RESEARCHERS—HUMAN CELLS 
USED IN THERAPY INVOLVING THE TRANSFER OF GENETIC MATERIAL BY 
MEANS OTHER THAN THE UNION OF GAMETE NUCLEI 
Department of Health and Human Services210 
Public Health Service 
Food and Drug Administration 
 
the same form; however, the applications are reviewed by different FDA staff, and different 
statutes govern the approval of each. See Frequently Asked Questions About Therapeutic 
Biological Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/drugs/
developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved/approvalapplications/
therapeuticbiologicapplications/ucm113522.htm (last updated July 7, 2015) (“Whereas a new 
drug application (NDA) is used for drugs subject to the drug approval provisions of the FDC 
Act, a biologics license application (BLA) is required for biological products subject to licensure 
under the PHS Act. FDA form 356h is used for both NDA and BLA submissions. FDA approval 
to market a biologic is granted by issuance of a biologics license.”); see also DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FORM FDA 356H, APPLICATION TO MARKET A 
NEW OR ABBREVIATED NEW DRUG OR BIOLOGIC FOR HUMAN USE (2017), http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Forms/UCM082348.pdf. 
 210 Letter from Kathryn C. Zoon, Dir., Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation & Research, U.S. Food & 
Drug Admin., to Sponsors/Researchers (July 6, 2001), http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBlood
Vaccines/SafetyAvailability/ucm105852.htm. 
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1401 Rockville Pike 
Rockville, MD 20852-1448 
 
July 6, 2001 
 
Dear Sponsor / Researcher: 
 
We want to advise you that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
has jurisdiction over human cells used in therapy involving the transfer 
of genetic material by means other than the union of gamete nuclei. 
 
Examples of such genetic material include, but are not limited to: 
• cell nuclei (e.g., for cloning), 
• oocyte nuclei, 
• ooplasm, which contains mitochondrial genetic material, and 
• genetic material contained in a genetic vector, transferred 
into gametes or other cells. 
 
The use of such genetically manipulated cells (and/or their derivatives) 
in humans constitutes a clinical investigation and requires submission 
of an Investigational New Drug application (IND) to FDA. We wish to 
inform you of the FDA regulatory process governing clinical 
investigations, which includes requirements applicable to 
manufacturing processes, the study of the safety and efficacy of such 
cells, and the protection of human participants in such studies. We can 
advise you whether or not your activities require submission of an IND. 
If what you are doing or plan to do does require an IND, we would be 
pleased to provide you with information and guidance regarding filing 
such an application. 
 
FDA’s regulations on investigational new drugs, including those for the 
submission and review of an IND are described in Title 21 of the Code 
of Federal Regulations (CFR), Parts 50, 56, and 312. The agency has 
provided notice of the applicability of these requirements to cellular and 
tissue-based products in many public forums and in various published 
documents available at http://www.fda.gov/cber, including the 
following: 
• A Federal Register (FR) notice describing FDA’s authority 
over cell and gene therapy products (“Application of Current 
Statutory Authorities to Human Somatic Cell Therapy 
Products and Gene Therapy Products,” October 14, 1993, 58 
FR 53248) (PDF - 489 KB). 
• A comprehensive regulatory program for the regulation of 
human cellular and tissue-based products, based on a tiered, 
risk-based assessment (“A Proposed Approach to the 
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Regulation of Cellular and Tissue-Based Products,” March 4, 
1997, 62 FR 9721). 
• A final rule that establishes the criteria for regulation of 
human cells, tissues, and cellular and tissue based products 
(HCT/Ps), including reproductive cells and tissues, published 
on January 19, 2001 (66 FR 5447). This rule also describes 
which HCT/Ps will be regulated solely under 21 CFR Part 
1271, the regulations to prevent communicable disease 
transmission authorized by section 361 of the Public Health 
Service Act. HCT/Ps that do not meet the criteria under Part 
1271 will be regulated as biological products, drugs, or 
devices under section 351 of the Public Health Service Act 
and/or the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act. 
• “Suitability Determination for Donors of Human Cellular 
and Tissue-Based Products; Proposed Rule.” September 30, 
1999 (64 FR 52696). 
• “Current Good Tissue Practice for Manufacture of Human 
Cellular and Tissue-Based Products; Inspection and 
Enforcement; Proposed Rule” January 8, 2001 (66 FR 1508). 
 
If you are unable to access the internet to obtain information on 
submitting an IND to the FDA, please call or write and we’ll supply you 
with the needed information: 
Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research 
Office of Communication, Training & Manufacturers Assistance 
Manufacturers Assistance and Technical Training Branch 
1401 Rockville Pike, HFM-44 
Rockville, MD 20852-1448 
800-835-4709 or 301-827-1800 
matt@cber.fda.gov 
 
The specific information required in an IND will depend upon the cells 
under investigation and on the phase of study. For assistance in 
determining whether you need to file an IND submission and in 
preparation of a submission, please contact Wendy Aaronson, 
Application Administration Branch Chief, Division of Application 
Review and Policy, at 301-827-5101. 
Sincerely, 
—signature— 
 
Kathryn C. Zoon, Ph.D. 
Director 
Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research 
Food and Drug Administration 
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APPENDIX B: LETTER ABOUT HUMAN CLONING 
October 26, 1998211 
Dear Colleague: 
 
The purpose of this letter is to confirm to institutional review boards 
(IRBs) that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has jurisdiction 
over clinical research using cloning technology to create a human being, 
and to inform IRBs of the FDA regulatory process that is required 
before any investigator can proceed with such a clinical investigation. 
This letter is being sent to IRBs at this time because of reports in the 
media that scientists are contemplating the use of cloning technology to 
create human beings. As described more fully below, the appropriate 
mechanism to pursue a clinical investigation using cloning technology is 
the submission of an investigational new drug application (IND) to 
FDA. 
 
Clinical research using cloning technology to create a human being is 
subject to FDA regulation under the Public Health Service Act and the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Under these statutes and FDA’s 
implementing regulations, before such research may begin, the sponsor 
of the research is required to submit to FDA an IND describing the 
proposed research plan; to obtain authorization from a properly 
constituted and functioning IRB; and to obtain a commitment from the 
investigators to obtain informed consent from all human subjects of the 
research. Such research may proceed only when an IND is in effect. 
Since FDA believes that there are major unresolved safety questions 
pertaining to the use of cloning technology to create a human being, 
until those questions are appropriately addressed in the IND, FDA 
would not permit any such investigation to proceed. 
 
FDA may prohibit a sponsor from conducting a study proposed in an 
IND application (often referred to as placing the study on “clinical 
hold”) for a variety of reasons. If the Agency finds that “human subjects 
are or would be exposed to an unreasonable and significant risk of 
illness or injury,” that would be sufficient reason to put a study on 
clinical hold. Other reasons listed in the regulations include “the IND 
does not contain sufficient information required . . . to address the risks 
to subjects of the proposed studies,” or “the clinical investigators . . . are 
not qualified by reason of their scientific training and experience to 
conduct the investigation.” 
 
 
 211 Nightingale, supra note 72. 
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The procedures and requirements governing the use of investigational 
new drugs, including those for the submission and review of INDs, are 
set forth in Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 312. 
Additional responsibilities of the sponsor of an IND include: selecting 
qualified investigators and overseeing the conduct of the investigators; 
ensuring that the investigations are performed in accordance with the 
protocols of the IND; submitting adverse experience reports and annual 
reports; and other duties as outlined in the regulations. The 
responsibilities of an investigator include: ensuring that the study is 
conducted in accordance with the protocols; obtaining informed 
consent from study subjects; and ensuring that an IRB that complies 
with the requirements of 21 CFR Part 56 reviews and approves the 
proposed clinical study and the informed consent form and procedures 
for obtaining informed consent, among other requirements specified in 
the regulations. IRBs and clinical investigators may obtain a copy of the 
current “Information Sheets for IRBs and Clinical Investigators” by 
contacting FDA’s Office of Health Affairs (301-827-1685), through the 
world wide web (http://www.fda.gov/oha/IRB/toc.html*) or through a 
Fax-on-demand system (1-800-993-0098). 
 
We hope the above information is useful to you. Please feel free to share 
this information with others at your institution. 
Sincerely yours, 
 
/s/ 
Stuart L. Nightingale, M.D. 
Associate Commissioner 
APPENDIX C: UNTITLED LETTER (BIOLOGIC) 
March 12, 2015212 
 
VIA FACSIMILE AND UPS (UNITED PARCEL SERVICE) 
 
Samuel Simons 
Regulatory Manager 
Protein Sciences Corporation 
1000 Research Parkway 
Meriden, CT 06450 
 
Re: Flublok (Influenza Vaccine) 
 
 
 212 Letter from Robert A. Sausville to Samuel Simons, supra note 65. 
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BLA STN# 125285 
 
Dear Mr. Simons: 
 
The Advertising and Promotional Labeling Branch (APLB) at the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) Center for Biologics Evaluation 
and Research (CBER) has reviewed the video interview with CEO Dr. 
Manon Cox, entitled ‘Watch us on Lifetime – The Balancing Act,’ that is 
posted on the website www.flublok.com by your company, Protein 
Sciences Corporation (Protein Sciences). This promotional material is 
in violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (Act) and 
implementing regulations because it overstates the efficacy of Flublok 
(Influenza Vaccine) and omits the risks associated with Flublok. 
Therefore, this material misbrands Flublok under sections 502(a) and 
201(n) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) and § 321(n), and FDA 
implementing regulations, Cf. 21 CFR 202.1(e)(6)(i) and (e)(7)(viii). 
 
Background 
 
According to the FDA-approved prescribing information (PI), Flublok 
is a vaccine indicated for active immunization against disease caused by 
influenza virus subtypes A and type B contained in the vaccine. Flublok 
is approved for use in persons 18 years of age and older. 
 
The Warnings and Precautions section of the PI includes, but is not 
limited to, the following risks: 
 
Appropriate medical treatment and supervision must be available to 
manage possible anaphylactic reactions following administration of 
Flubok. 
 
If Guillain-Barré syndrome has occurred within 6 weeks of receipt of a 
prior influenza vaccine, the decision to give Flublok should be based on 
careful consideration of potential benefits and risks. 
 
Vaccination with Flublok may not protect all vaccine recipients. 
 
Page 2 – STN 125285 
 
The Adverse Reactions section includes, but is not limited to, the 
following: 
 
In adults 18 through 49 years of age, the most common (≥10%) 
injection-site reaction was pain (37%); the most common (≥10%) 
solicited systemic adverse reactions were headache (15%), fatigue (15%) 
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and muscle pain (11%). 
 
In adults 50 through 64 years of age, the most common (≥10%) 
injection site reaction was pain (32%); the most common (≥10%) 
solicited systemic adverse reactions were headache (17%), fatigue (13%), 
and muscle pain (11%). 
 
In adults 65 years of age and older, the most common (≥10%) injection 
site reaction was pain (19%); the most common (≥10%) solicited 
systemic adverse reactions were fatigue (13%) and headache (10%). 
 
Misleading Efficacy Claim 
 
Promotional materials are misleading if they represent or suggest that a 
product is more effective than has been demonstrated by substantial 
evidence or substantial clinical experience. Your video, entitled ‘Watch 
us on Lifetime – The Balancing Act,’ presents an interview with Dr. Cox 
in which she states that Protein Sciences ‘is able to put three times more 
protein in there, so it is also a high dose vaccine. More protein means your 
body will form more antibodies that will help you fight the flu.’ This claim 
misleadingly implies that the higher antigen content of Flublok 
translates into greater protection. Currently, there is only one licensed 
high-dose influenza vaccine, which is indicated for active immunization 
of persons 65 years of age and older against influenza disease caused by 
influenza virus subtypes A and type B contained in the vaccine. FDA is 
unaware of any adequate and well-controlled clinical trials that 
substantiate this claim for your product. Furthermore, in our October 
20, 2014 letter to Protein Sciences on this issue, we provided advisory 
comments regarding the misleading implication of this claim. We 
reiterated our comments in a teleconference with Dr. Manon Cox on 
November 10, 2014. 
 
Omission of Risk Information 
 
Promotional materials are misleading if they fail to reveal facts that are 
material in light of representations made by the materials or with 
respect to consequences that may result from the use of the drug as 
recommended or suggested by the materials. 
 
Specifically, the video presents multiple efficacy claims for Flublok, such 
as ‘helps you fight the flu,’ but fails to present any important safety 
information from the PI. 
 
Conclusion and Requested Actions 
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For the reasons discussed above, your promotional material misbrands 
Flublok under sections 502(a) and 201(n) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) 
and § 321(n), and FDA implementing regulations, Cf. 21 CFR 
202.1(e)(6)(i) and (e)(7)(viii). 
 
We request that Protein Sciences immediately cease the dissemination 
of this violative promotional material for Flublok, as well as 
promotional materials with the same or similar claims and 
representations. Please submit a written response within ten (10) 
business days of the 
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date of this letter, stating whether you intend to comply with this 
request, listing all violative promotional materials for Flublok and 
explaining your plan for discontinuing use of such materials. Please 
direct your response to Lisa Stockbridge, Ph.D., Branch Chief at the 
Food and Drug Administration, Center for Biologics Evaluation and 
Research, Office of Compliance and Biologics Quality, Division of Case 
Management, Advertising and Promotional Labeling Branch, 10903 
New Hampshire Ave., WO71-G112, Silver Spring, MD 20993-0002. In 
all future correspondence regarding this matter, please refer to the 
BLA/STN number. We remind you that only written communications 
are considered official responses. 
 
The violations discussed in this letter do not necessarily constitute an 
exhaustive list. It is your responsibility to ensure that your promotional 
materials for Flublok comply with each applicable requirement of the 
Act and FDA implementing regulations. 
 
If you choose to revise your promotional materials, APLB is willing to 
assist you in assuring that your revised materials comply with applicable 
provisions of the Act by reviewing your revisions before you use them in 
promotion. 
 
Sincerely, 
Robert A. Sausville 
Director, Division of Case Management 
Office of Compliance and Biologics Quality 
Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research 
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APPENDIX D: WARNING LETTER ISSUED TO 23ANDME, INC. 
Nov 22, 2013213 
 
Ann Wojcicki 
CEO 
23andMe, Inc. 
1390 Shoreline Way 
Mountain View, CA 94043 
 
Document Number: GEN1300666 
Re: Personal Genome Service (PGS) 
 
WARNING LETTER 
 
Dear Ms. Wojcicki, 
 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is sending you this letter 
because you are marketing the 23andMe Saliva Collection Kit and 
Personal Genome Service (PGS) without marketing clearance or 
approval in violation of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (the 
FD&C Act). 
 
This product is a device within the meaning of section 201(h) of the 
FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 321(h), because it is intended for use in the 
diagnosis of disease or other conditions or in the cure, mitigation, 
treatment, or prevention of disease, or is intended to affect the structure 
or function of the body. For example, your company’s website at 
www.23andme.com/health (most recently viewed on November 6, 2013) 
markets the PGS for providing “health reports on 254 diseases and 
conditions,” including categories such as “carrier status,” “health risks,” 
and “drug response,” and specifically as a “first step in prevention” that 
enables users to “take steps toward mitigating serious diseases” such as 
diabetes, coronary heart disease, and breast cancer. Most of the intended 
uses for PGS listed on your website, a list that has grown over time, are 
medical device uses under section 201(h) of the FD&C Act. Most of 
these uses have not been classified and thus require premarket approval 
or de novo classification, as FDA has explained to you on numerous 
occasions. 
 
 
 213 Letter from Alberto Gutierrez, Dir., Office of In Vitro Diagnostics & Radiological Health, 
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Ann Wojcicki, Chief Exec. Officer, 23andMe, Inc. (Nov. 22, 
2013), http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/2013/ucm376296.htm). 
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Some of the uses for which PGS is intended are particularly concerning, 
such as assessments for BRCA-related genetic risk and drug responses 
(e.g., warfarin sensitivity, clopidogrel response, and 5-fluorouracil 
toxicity) because of the potential health consequences that could result 
from false positive or false negative assessments for high-risk 
indications such as these. For instance, if the BRCA-related risk 
assessment for breast or ovarian cancer reports a false positive, it could 
lead a patient to undergo prophylactic surgery, chemoprevention, 
intensive screening, or other morbidity-inducing actions, while a false 
negative could result in a failure to recognize an actual risk that may 
exist. Assessments for drug responses carry the risks that patients 
relying on such tests may begin to self-manage their treatments through 
dose changes or even abandon certain therapies depending on the 
outcome of the assessment. For example, false genotype results for your 
warfarin drug response test could have significant unreasonable risk of 
illness, injury, or death to the patient due to thrombosis or bleeding 
events that occur from treatment with a drug at a dose that does not 
provide the appropriately calibrated anticoagulant effect. These risks are 
typically mitigated by International Normalized Ratio (INR) 
management under a physician’s care. The risk of serious injury or 
death is known to be high when patients are either non-compliant or 
not properly dosed; combined with the risk that a direct-to-consumer 
test result may be used by a patient to self-manage, serious concerns are 
raised if test results are not adequately understood by patients or if 
incorrect test results are reported. 
 
Your company submitted 510(k)s for PGS on July 2, 2012 and 
September 4, 2012, for several of these indications for use. However, to 
date, your company has failed to address the issues described during 
previous interactions with the Agency or provide the additional 
information identified in our September 13, 2012 letter for (b)(4) and in 
our November 20, 2012 letter for (b)(4), as required under 21 CFR 
807.87(1). Consequently, the 510(k)s are considered withdrawn, see 21 
C.F.R. 807.87(1), as we explained in our letters to you on March 12, 
2013 and May 21, 2013. To date, 23andMe has failed to provide 
adequate information to support a determination that the PGS is 
substantially equivalent to a legally marketed predicate for any of the 
uses for which you are marketing it; no other submission for the PGS 
device that you are marketing has been provided under section 510(k) of 
the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360(k).  
 
The Office of In Vitro Diagnostics and Radiological Health (OIR) has a 
long history of working with companies to help them come into 
compliance with the FD&C Act. Since July of 2009, we have been 
diligently working to help you comply with regulatory requirements 
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regarding safety and effectiveness and obtain marketing authorization 
for your PGS device. FDA has spent significant time evaluating the 
intended uses of the PGS to determine whether certain uses might be 
appropriately classified into class II, thus requiring only 510(k) 
clearance or de novo classification and not PMA approval, and we have 
proposed modifications to the device’s labeling that could mitigate risks 
and render certain intended uses appropriate for de novo classification. 
Further, we provided ample detailed feedback to 23andMe regarding the 
types of data it needs to submit for the intended uses of the PGS. As part 
of our interactions with you, including more than 14 face-to-face and 
teleconference meetings, hundreds of email exchanges, and dozens of 
written communications, we provided you with specific feedback on 
study protocols and clinical and analytical validation requirements, 
discussed potential classifications and regulatory pathways (including 
reasonable submission timelines), provided statistical advice, and 
discussed potential risk mitigation strategies. As discussed above, FDA 
is concerned about the public health consequences of inaccurate results 
from the PGS device; the main purpose of compliance with FDA’s 
regulatory requirements is to ensure that the tests work. 
 
However, even after these many interactions with 23andMe, we still do 
not have any assurance that the firm has analytically or clinically 
validated the PGS for its intended uses, which have expanded from the 
uses that the firm identified in its submissions. In your letter dated 
January 9, 2013, you stated that the firm is “completing the additional 
analytical and clinical validations for the tests that have been submitted” 
and is “planning extensive labeling studies that will take several months 
to complete.” Thus, months after you submitted your 510(k)s and more 
than 5 years after you began marketing, you still had not completed 
some of the studies and had not even started other studies necessary to 
support a marketing submission for the PGS. It is now eleven months 
later, and you have yet to provide FDA with any new information about 
these tests. You have not worked with us toward de novo classification, 
did not provide the additional information we requested necessary to 
complete review of your 510(k)s, and FDA has not received any 
communication from 23andMe since May. Instead, we have become 
aware that you have initiated new marketing campaigns, including 
television commercials that, together with an increasing list of 
indications, show that you plan to expand the PGS’s uses and consumer 
base without obtaining marketing authorization from FDA. 
 
Therefore, 23andMe must immediately discontinue marketing the PGS 
until such time as it receives FDA marketing authorization for the 
device. The PGS is in class III under section 513(f) of the FD&C Act, 21 
U.S.C. 360c(f). Because there is no approved application for premarket 
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approval in effect pursuant to section 515(a) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 
360e(a), or an approved application for an investigational device 
exemption (IDE) under section 520(g) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 
360j(g), the PGS is adulterated under section 501(f)(1)(B) of the FD&C 
Act, 21 U.S.C. 351(f)(1)(B). Additionally, the PGS is misbranded under 
section 502(o) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(o), because notice or other 
information respecting the device was not provided to FDA as required 
by section 510(k) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360(k). 
 
Please notify this office in writing within fifteen (15) working days from 
the date you receive this letter of the specific actions you have taken to 
address all issues noted above. Include documentation of the corrective 
actions you have taken. If your actions will occur over time, please 
include a timetable for implementation of those actions. If corrective 
actions cannot be completed within 15 working days, state the reason 
for the delay and the time within which the actions will be completed. 
Failure to take adequate corrective action may result in regulatory 
action being initiated by the Food and Drug Administration without 
further notice. These actions include, but are not limited to, seizure, 
injunction, and civil money penalties. 
 
We have assigned a unique document number that is cited above. The 
requested information should reference this document number and 
should be submitted to: 
 
James L. Woods, WO66-5688 
Deputy Director 
Patient Safety and Product Quality 
Office of In vitro Diagnostics and Radiological Health 
10903 New Hampshire Avenue 
Silver Spring, MD 20993 
 
If you have questions relating to this matter, please feel free to call 
Courtney Lias, Ph.D. at 301-796-5458, or log onto our web site at 
www.fda.gov for general information relating to FDA device 
requirements. 
 
 
Sincerely yours, 
/S/ 
Alberto Gutierrez 
Director 
Office of In vitro Diagnostics 
and Radiological Health 
 Center for Devices and Radiological Health 
